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Abstract
We want to build animated characters and robots capable of rich social interactions
with humans and each other, and who are able to learn by observing those around
them. An increasing amount of evidence suggests that, in human infants, the ability
to learn by watching others, and in particular, the ability to imitate, could be crucial
precursors to the development of appropriate social behavior, and ultimately the
ability to reason about the thoughts, intents, beliefs, and desires of others.
We have created a number of imitative characters and robots, the latest of which
is Max T. Mouse, an anthropomorphic animated mouse character who is able to ob-
serve the actions he sees his friend Morris Mouse performing, and compare them to
the actions he knows how to perform himself. This matching process allows Max to
accurately imitate Morris's gestures and actions, even when provided with limited
synthetic visual input. Furthermore, by using his own perception, motor, and action
systems as models for the behavioral and perceptual capabilities of others (a process
known as Simulation Theory in the cognitive literature), Max can begin to identify
simple goals and motivations for Morris's behavior, an important step towards devel-
oping characters with a full theory of mind. Finally, Max can learn about unfamiliar
objects in his environment, such as food and toys, by observing and correctly in-
terpreting Morris's interactions with these objects, demonstrating his ability to take
advantage of socially acquired information.
Thesis Supervisor: Bruce M. Blumberg
Title: Associate Professor of Media Arts and Sciences
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Humans, and many other animals, display a remarkably flexible and rich array of
social competencies, demonstrating the ability to interpret, predict and react appro-
priately to the behavior of others, and to engage others in a variety of complex social
interactions. Developing systems that have these same sorts of social abilities is a
critical step in designing robots, animated characters, and other computer agents,
who appear intelligent and capable in their interactions with humans and each other,
who are intuitive and engaging for humans to interact with, and who maximize their
ability to learn from the world around them. The aim of this thesis is to work to-
wards the ultimate goal of socially intelligent artificial systems, by creating animated
characters capable of interpreting and learning from the actions and intentions of
others.
1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Socially Intelligent Characters and Robots
Some of the most exciting new applications being developed for synthetic creatures
require them to cooperate with humans and each other as socially capable partners.
For instance, animated characters and robots are being developed as individualized
tutors for children. Such a character should be encouraging and persuasive in ways
that are sensitive to the child, adjusting to their learning style and current mood, in
order to hold or reclaim attention. In general, characters and robots that interact with
people need to respond with social appropriateness, and they must be easy for the
average person to use and relate to. They must also be able to quickly learn new skills
and how to perform new tasks from human instruction and demonstration. Ideally,
programming such a character with new capabilities would be as easy as showing it
what to do. Finally, to cooperate with humans as capable partners artificial creatures
must be able to interpret our behaviors and emotions, so that they can provide us
with well-timed, relevant assistance.
1.1.2 Natural Systems
As character designers, it is possible to gain valuable insights into how social in-
telligence might operate and be acquired by looking to the fields of developmental
psychology and animal behavior. It appears that, among animals, learning from
the behavior of others (known as social learning) is by no means a single mono-
lithic process. Rather, species sample widely from a spectrum of overlapping social
competencies [122], ranging from using information about others to help focus their
attention, to emulating other's actions and goal states.
While very few species exhibit the most complex forms of imitation, and perhaps
no non-human animal possesses a full theory of mind [93], the abilities animals do
possess allow them to consistently exploit their social environment in ways that far
outstrip our current technologies. Furthermore, many of the simpler behavior-reading
abilities present in animals may represent prerequisites for the more complex mind-
reading abilities humans possess. An increasing amount of evidence suggests that, in
human infants, the ability to learn by watching others, and in particular, the ability to
imitate, could be crucial precursors to the development of appropriate social behavior,
and ultimately the ability to reason about the behaviors, emotions, beliefs, and intents
of others [86] [84] [87].
1.2 Approach
In previous work, we began to explore the role of imitation and social learning in
artificial intelligence, by implementing a facial imitation architecture for an interactive
humanoid robot [28]. In this thesis, I present a novel system that provides artificial
creatures with a cognitive architecture inspired by the literature on animal social
learning, including a robust mechanism for observing and imitating whole gestures
and movements. Critically, the characters presented in this thesis are able to use
their imitative abilities to bootstrap simple mechanisms for identifying each other's
low-level goals and motivations and learning from each other's actions, bringing us
several steps closer to the goal of creating socially intelligent artificial creatures.
1.3 Contributions
1.3.1 What This Thesis Does
This work concerns the creation of synthetic creatures capable of a number of in-
teresting and novel forms of social learning, inspired by the cognitive literature. In
particular, characters with the following capabilities were implemented for this thesis:
" Correctly imitating and identifying observed gestures and movements after a
single demonstration. Furthermore, the characters in this thesis observe each
other using synthetic vision, and imitate each other using purely visual data.
" Identifying higher-level goal-directed behaviors, such as reaching for an object.
" Identifying potential motivations and goals for another character's actions, such
as a desire to satisfy hunger, or to possess an object.
* Learning based on observing other character's behavior, such as learning about
a new food object by watching another character consume it.
The goal of this thesis was not only to create synthetic creatures capable of learning
by observing each other, but to test out theories from the cognitive literature while
doing so. To this end, this work hopes to make two additional contributions:
" Testing the prominent theory that imitative abilities help bootstrap social learn-
ing skills in humans, and the related idea that Simulation Theory (described in
section 2.2.2) can be used to understand other's actions, motivations and goals.
* Discovering underlying similarities or shared mechanisms among the large vari-
ety of social learning abilities hypothesized in the cognitive literature.
1.3.2 What This Thesis Doesn't Do
Social learning and intelligence in artificial systems represents a vast research area,
and this thesis is necessarily limited to a sub-section of the potential topics that fall
under this rubric. The following is a list of topics and approaches outside the scope
of this thesis (though a number of them have been anticipated as application areas
for this work):
" While the work in this thesis is inspired by theories in the cognitive and animal
behavior literatures, it is not meant to implement the details of any specific
model of how animals and humans learn from each other. Similarly, ideas from
the cognitive literature are implemented within this thesis at a purely repre-
sentational level--this thesis does not address the neural substrate underlying
these abilities in humans and animals.
e The system presented in this thesis was designed to be general enough for use
with both animated characters and robots. However, so far, it has only been
tested using animated characters, and this is the application area that will be
focused on in this work.
" Similarly, while I believe the approach described in this work may be gen-
eralizable to human-robot and human-character interactions, this thesis uses
character-character interactions as its starting point.
" The primary focus of this work is on imitation as a means of achieving other
social learning capabilities, rather than imitation as an end-goal in itself. As
a result, this thesis does not delve deeply into problem areas such as imitating
characters with different morphologies, or learning novel movement primitives
through imitation.
* This work assumes that characters have very similar morphology, abilities and
motivations.An expectation of sameness is actually a fundamental assumption
of Simulation Theory, one of the primary theories of human cognition motivating
this work (described in section 2.2.2).
1.4 Roadmap
To begin with, Appendix B of this thesis contains definitions of potentially am-
biguous terminology used throughout this work, and may be worth consulting before
venturing in too deeply. In the following chapter (chapter 2), I explore the cogni-
tive theories motivating my approach to artificial social learning in a bit more detail.
Chapter 3 places this research in the context of previous work in interactive char-
acter design and social robotics. Subsequently, in chapter 4 I introduce Max and
Morris Mouse, two anthropomorphic animated mouse characters who are able to in-
teract with each other, and observe each others' behavior. I then present a series
of progressively more sophisticated results, in which Max the Mouse is initially able
to imitate Morris, and is ultimately able to identify Morris's action-structure, in-
cluding simple motivations and goals, and learn from Morris's actions. Chapter 5
presents the details of the Synthetic Characters creature architecture used to create
Max and Morris, while chapter 6 explores the implementation of the social learning
mechanisms at the heart of this thesis.
Finally, in chapter 7 I discuss possible future work and extensions, and the
implications of my results for both artificially intelligent agents and natural systems.
It is worth noting that while the ultimate goal of this work is the development of
socially intelligent artificial creatures, the approach presented here has the potential
to contribute to a number of other research areas such as movement and gesture
recognition, and motor system design for animated characters.
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Chapter 2
Lessons from Social Learning in
Humans and Animals
The natural world is teeming with examples of social behavior, from fish forming
schools and birds forming flocks, to wolf pups tussling to determine dominance, to
domestic cats begging their owners for food. In all of these cases, animals are able
to interact and communicate appropriately with conspecifics in their environment (if
you accept, for the moment, that you're a conspecific to your cat), in order to satisfy
their individual motivations and goals (e.g. safety from predators, establishing place
in pack hierarchy, acquiring food).
Within the broad range of social behaviors animals display, we are particularly
interested in social learning, where "acquisition of behavior by one animal can be
influenced by social interaction with others of its species" (Heyes and Galef 1996
[62], p.8). The ethological literature is filled with examples of animals learning by
observing and interacting with others. Some classic instances include the spread of
milk-bottle opening behavior among great tits in Britain [49], macaques learning to
wash potatoes [64], and black rats learning how to pull the scales off of pine cones
[108]. Many other well-studied behavior patterns can also be considered forms of
social learning, such as juvenile song-birds learning species-specific song patterns by
listening to adults [106], and alarm-call learning by young ground squirrels [79] and
vervet monkeys [105].
There is a wide range of ways in which animals are able to learn from the presence
of others, which run the gamut from simply interacting with objects others have left
behind (as in the case of the black rats, who learn to shell pine cones by coming
across the partially shelled remains left by adult rats), to learning an emotional stance
towards an object by watching others interact with it [38] [40], to imitating either
the results or the end-goal of another's actions [114][83], to imitating the physical
behaviors performed by another [84] [119]. Of these, the behaviors that traditionally
fall under the auspices of social learning are those where one animal learns directly
from the observed behavior of another (e.g. a chimpanzee using a rake to bring
food closer, after seeing another chimpanzee perform the task), rather than those
where they are indirectly influenced by another's actions (e.g. the black rats). In the
following sections, I will explore this kind of social learning, as well as its relationship
to more general social intelligence, and the development of theory of mind.
2.1 Imitation and Social Learning in Animals
There is a rich research literature available investigating social learning in a variety
of animal species, particularly non-human primates. Much of this literature has been
devoted to partitioning socially mediated learning into various subtypes (for a review
see [122], [36], [35] and also [62]). The primary contribution of this research to the
design of socially adept artificial systems may lie not in the divisions between types
of social learning that have occupied much of the research agenda, but rather in
the spectrum of potential social learning situations and mechanisms these divisions
highlight. Here, I draw attention to some of the most commonly cited ways in which
one organism could potentially learn by observing another (the categories I use have
been roughly adapted from Whiten [122]).
Attention Shifting. The animal's attentional focus is affected by others actions.
This includes stimulus enhancement, where the observer becomes more likely to
attend to and interact with stimuli it has noticed a model attending to.
Significance Learning Using other's behavior and reactions as cues about the sig-
nificance of objects in the environment. This includes social referencing, where
the observer alters his reaction to a stimulus based on the observed behavior of
a model, and affordance learning, where the animal learns certain properties of
the environment, or of objects in the environment, through observation.
Impersonation Copying the form of another's action. This category encompasses
relatively simple behaviors such as response facilitation, where the observer
becomes more likely to perform an action already in its repertoire, as a result
of seeing a model perform that action, as well as behaviors such as mimicry,
emulation and true imitation. In mimicry, the observer replicates the physical
movements of the model, while in emulation it is the end-state generated by
the model's actions that is replicated. In true imitation the observer attempts
to replicate not only the model's actions, but also their perceived goals.
Learning About Others Information about conspecifics is gathered over the course
of interactions. This includes learning the positions of different group members
in a dominance hierarchy, and perspective-taking, where one animal takes ac-
tions that take another's visual point-of-view into account. It also includes
more advanced theory of mind, where one animal must model some aspect on
another's internal mental state.
In both comparative psychology and robotics, there has perhaps been too much
focus on 'true' imitation, to the exclusion of studying other potentially important and
useful social learning mechanisms (this problem is discussed by Byrne and Russon [35]
and in accompanying commentaries, including [45], [61],[80] and [99]). In particular,
Roitblat [99] notes that there is a danger of defining a phenomena out of existence,
by setting the standards at such a level that it cannot be said to occur. He goes
on to point out that mechanisms such as stimulus enhancement, goal emulation, and
response facilitation may be complex and sophisticated in their own right, and have
up until now been used almost exclusively as null hypotheses in the study of imitation
in animals.
In a related vein, Call and Carpenter [36] suggest approaching the problem of social
learning from a different angle-by looking at the sources of information exploited by
the observing animal, rather than focusing on defining the social learning mechanism
being used. They suggest that, in any sort of observational learning, three distinct
sources of information are available to be observed and copied: the model's goals, the
model's actions, and the results of those actions, and that each of these information
sources provides a different set of useful knowledge about the world. For instance,
focusing on the results of actions may help an animal learn about the physical world,
and lead to behaviors such as emulation, while focusing on the actions themselves may
help a creature understand other individuals, and lead to more traditional mimicry
behavior. Call and Carpenter believe that ultimately, attending to all three sources
of information is critical to human social development.
Similarly, it seems likely that, in order to develop socially intelligent robots and
animated characters, we will need to implement a variety of mechanisms for taking
advantage of the information provided by others, rather than focusing on one form of
imitation, or one source of information. As a result, the behavior of the characters in
this thesis does not fall precisely into categories such as imitation, stimulus enhance-
ment, or social referencing, but instead allows the characters to combine an amalgam
of biologically-inspired abilities in order to correctly reproduce observed behaviors,
and begin to identify intentions, motivations and goals. In turn, it is possible that
looking at how these sorts of abilities are implemented in an artificial system will
give us greater insight into the different cognitive mechanisms behind animal social
learning. In the next section, I look at how the perception and production of hier-
archical action structures can allow animals (and potentially, artificial creatures) to
take advantage of multiple levels of observational information.
2.1.1 Imitation and Hierarchical Action Structures
Hierarchical, motivationally-driven behavior selection mechanisms have frequently
been suggested in the animal behavior literature (see for instance [111] and [44] for
some classic examples). Timberlake [110] [109] has proposed a particularly detailed
Mode Module
Figure 2-1: An example motivational system for animal feeding (after Timberlake
1989 [110])
theory of hierarchical behavioral structures in animals, known as the behavior systems
approach. According to Timberlake, an animal's action hierarchy is composed of be-
havioral systems, each of which is associated with an innate motivation or drive, such
as feeding, self-defense, or socializing. Within a motivational system, each level of the
hierarchy contains increasingly specific, sequentially organized actions for satisfying
the associated drive (an example motivational system is shown in figure 2-1). This
type of action structure is intuitively appealing because it breaks behaviors down
into the same sorts of levels and sequences people tend to use when describing a task.
Research has shown that people naturally parse action streams into hierarchies of
intentional relations [91 [10].
Using the idea of hierarchically organized action systems, such as those proposed
by Timberlake, Bryne and Russon [35] have proposed another way in which to broaden
the definition of imitation. They suggest that much animal imitation occurs at the
"program" level, where an animal with a hierarchical action system learns a program
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for organizing its actions by observing the hierarchical structure of another animal's
behavior. Subsequently, it is this hierarchical organization that is imitated, rather
than the surface form of the other animal's movements. Program level imitation is
contrasted with what they define as action level imitation, in which it is the specific
physical movements of the model that are replicated. Byrne and Russon suggest
that most task-oriented imitation is program-level imitation, whereas action-level
imitation is more rare, and may serve a primarily social purpose (this can be seen
as somewhat analogous to Call and Carpenter's discussion of imitation of actions,
results, and goals, discussed in the previous section). In addition to Byrne and
Russon's observational studies, some support for this theory comes from Whiten's
experimental demonstrations of imitation of sequential (and potentially hierarchical)
action structures in chimpanzees, and imitation of hierarchical behaviors by young
children [121].
Byrne and Russon's theory emphasizes the idea that imitation may operate at
a number of levels, and outlines a possible mechanism by which this could occur-
the perception and production of hierarchical action structures. They suggest that
imitation occurs at multiple stages of the action hierarchy: from imitating individual
movement primitives at the lowest level, to imitating the arrangement of behavioral
modes and modules (to borrow Timberlake's terminology), to adopting the high-level
goal or motivation at the top of the hierarchy.
Most previous work in robotic imitation has focused on teaching robots or ani-
mated characters individual actions meant to solve a particular task, taking advantage
of only the lowest level of imitation. Since our behavior architecture is based on a hi-
erarchical action system, we are in an excellent position to explore and take advantage
of imitative learning at other levels of the action hierarchy.
2.2 Learning About Others
Note: Portions of the following section are adapted or reprinted from [28].
Research in the field of human cognitive development suggests that the ability to learn
by watching others, and in particular, the ability to imitate, are not only important
components of learning new behaviors (or new contexts in which to perform existing
behaviors), but could be critical to the development of appropriate social behavior,
and ultimately, theory of mind (ToM). In particular, Meltzoff (see for example [86],
[83],[84], [85] and [95]) presents a variety of evidence for the presence of imitative
abilities in children from very early infancy, and proposes that this capacity could
be foundational to more sophisticated social learning, and to ToM. The crux of his
hypothesis is that infants' ability to translate the perception of another's action into
the production of their own action provides a basis for learning about self-other
similarities, and the connection between behaviors and the mental states producing
them. I will explore this idea more thoroughly in the following sections.
2.2.1 Understanding Other's Minds
For artificial creatures to possess human-like social intelligence, they must be able to
infer the mental states of others (e.g., their thoughts, intents, beliefs, desires, etc.)
from observable behavior (e.g., their gestures, facial expressions, speech, actions,
etc.). This competence is referred to as a theory of mind [93], folk psychology [57],
mindreading [123], or social commonsense [87].
In humans, this ability is accomplished in part by each participant treating the
other as a conspecific-viewing the other as being "like me". Perceiving similarities
between self and other is an important part of the ability to take the role or perspective
of another, allowing people to relate to, and empathize with, their social partners.
This sort of perspective shift may help us to predict and explain other's emotions,
behaviors and other mental states, and to formulate appropriate responses based on
this understanding. For instance, it enables us to infer the intent or goal enacted by
another's behavior-an important skill for understanding other's actions.
2.2.2 Simulation Theory
Simulation Theory (ST) is one of the dominant hypotheses about the nature of the
cognitive mechanisms that underlie theory of mind [57] [43]. It can perhaps best be
summarized by the cliche "to know a man is to walk a mile in his shoes." Simulation
Theory posits that by simulating another person's actions and the stimuli they are
experiencing using our own behavioral and stimulus processing mechanisms, humans
can make predictions about the behaviors and mental states of others, based on the
mental states and behaviors that we would possess in their situation. In short, by
thinking "as if" we were the other person, we can use our own cognitive, behavioral,
and motivational systems to understand what is going on in the heads of others.
From a design perspective, Simulation Theory is appealing because it suggests
that instead of requiring a separate set of mechanisms for simulating other persons,
we can make predictions about others by using our own cognitive mechanisms to
recreate how we would think, feel, and act in their situation-thereby providing us
some insight into their emotions, beliefs, desires, intentions etc. We argue that an ST-
based mechanism could also be used by robots and animated characters to understand
humans and each other in a similar way. Importantly, it is a strategy that naturally
lends itself to representing the internal state of others and of the character itself in
comparable terms. This would facilitate an artificial creature's ability to compare
its own internal state to that of a person or character it is interacting with, in order
to infer their mental states or to learn from observing their behavior. Such theories
could provide a foothold for ultimately endowing machines with human-style social
skills, learning abilities, and social understanding.
2.2.3 Imitation and Simulation Theory
Meltzoff proposes that the way in which infants learn to simulate others is through
imitative interactions. For instance, Meltzoff [84] hypothesizes that the human in-
fant's ability to translate the perception of another's action into the production of
their own action provides a basis for learning about self-other similarities, and for
learning the connection between behaviors and the mental states producing them.
Simulation Theory rests on the assumption that the other is enough "like me"
that he can be simulated using one's own machinery. Thus, in order to successfully
imitate and be imitated, the infant must be able to recognize structural congruence
between himself and the adult model (i.e., notice when his body is "like" that of
the caregiver, or when the caregiver's body is "like" his own). The initial "like me"
experiences provided by imitative exchanges could lay the foundation for learning
about additional behavioral and mental similarities between self and other.
There are a number of ways in which imitation could help bootstrap a Simulation
Theory-type ToM [851. To begin with, imitating another's expression or movement is a
literal simulation of their behavior. By physically copying what the adult is doing, the
infant must, in a primitive sense, generate many of the same mental phenomena the
adult is experiencing, such as the motor plans for the movement. Meltzoff notes that
the extent to which a motor plan can be considered a low-level intention, imitation
provides the opportunity to begin learning connections between perceived behaviors
and the intentions that produce them. Additionally, facial imitation and other forms
of cross-modal imitation require the infant to compare the seen movements of the
adult to his own felt movements. This provides an opportunity to begin learning
the relationship between the visual perception of an action and the sensation of that
action.
Emotional empathy and social referencing are two of the earliest forms of social
understanding that facial imitation could facilitate. Experiments have shown that
producing a facial expression generally associated with a particular emotion is suffi-
cient for eliciting that emotion [107]. Hence, simply mimicking the facial expressions
of others could cause the infant to feel what the other is feeling.
2.2.4 Mirror Neurons
Interestingly, a relatively recently discovered class of neurons in monkeys, labeled
mirror neurons, has been proposed as a possible neurological mechanism underlying
both imitative abilities and Simulation Theory-type prediction of other's behaviors
and mental states [124] [53]. Within area F5 of the monkey's premotor cortex, these
neurons show similar activity both when a primate observes a goal-directed action
of another (such as grasping or manipulating an object), and when it carries out
that same goal-directed action [52] [98].This firing pattern has led researchers to
hypothesize that there exists a common coding between perceived and generated
actions [94]. These neurons may play an important role in the mechanisms used by
humans and other animals to relate their own actions to the actions of others. To date,
it is unknown if mirror neurons are innate in humans, learned through experience, or
both.
Mirror neurons are seen as part of a possible neural mechanism for Simulation
Theory. By activating the same neural areas while perceiving an action as while
carrying it out, it may not only be possible but also necessary to recreate additional
mental states frequently associated with that action. A mirror neuron-like structure
could be an important building block in a mechanism for making predictions about
someone else's intentions and beliefs by first locating the perceived action within the
observer's own action system, and then identifying one's own beliefs or intentions
typically possessed while carrying out that action, and attributing them to the other
person.
2.2.5 Understanding Observed Actions
People and other animals often interpret and react to the behavior of others in ways
that, at least implicitly, assume that others have intentionality and internal mental
state. At the most basic level, when one person watches another, they must divide the
continuous stream of motion they observe into individual units of action. Experiments
by Baldwin and Baird [10] [9] have shown that, given evidence that they are watching
an intentional entity, adults "appear to process continuous action streams in terms of
hierarchical relations that link smaller-level intentions (e.g. in a kitchen cleaning-up
scenario: intending to grasp a dish, turn on the water, pass the dish under the water)
with intentions at higher levels (intending to wash a dish or clean a kitchen)." (p.172,
[10]). In other words, adult humans are biased to interpret actions they observe as
part of an intentional or motivational action hierarchy, much like that described in
section 2.1.1.
Furthermore, "adults reliably identify certain actions at the more fine-grained
level as especially crucial or defining of intentions at the higher level; for instance,
the action of scrubbing a dish with a brush is more of a crux for completing the
intention to wash a dish than is the equally necessary but less central prior action
of turning on the water" (p.172, [10]).This idea, that certain movements can 'capture
the essence' of an action, is especially important to this work. It suggests that,
one way in which a more primitive imitation-based movement identification system
can be bootstrapped for more complex social skills, is through the identification of
"characteristic" movements, which, when observed, can serve as clues to what the
higher level behavior being performed is.
Interpreting observed actions as intentional is not limited to adults. Baird and
Baldwin have established that similar abilities exist in infants [9] [10], while Csibra
has demonstrated that infants are biased to interpret movements with certain formal
structures (e.g. self propelled, following indirect paths, obstacle avoidance) as being
goal-directed, even when watching abstract shapes rather than other people or animals
[39]. Finally, Meltzoff [83] has shown that by 18 months of age, infants imitate
the apparent goal or intention of an action, rather than the action itself (this is
demonstrated by their ability to produce the desired result of an action, in response
to seeing the action attempted unsuccessfully).
Baldwin and Baird propose that humans use both top-down inferential and bottom-
up perceptual mechanisms for dividing observed motion into separate acts. They
suggest that intentional behavior is marked by certain predictable features.
For example, to act intentionally on an inanimate object, we must locate
that object with our sensors (inanimates do not do this, as they usually
do not have sensors). We then typically launch our bodies in the direction
specified by our sensors, extend our arms, shape our hands to grasp the
relevant object, manipulate and ultimately release it (inanimates usually
do not do any of this either). All of this typically coincides with a char-
acteristic kind of ballistic trajectory that provides a temporal contour or
'envelope' demarcating one intentional act from the next...
This is all to say that on a purely structural level-the level of statistical
regularities-there is considerable information correlated with intentions
that is inherent in the flow of goal-directed action. (p. 17 4 [10]).
While there is compelling evidence that these sorts of demarkations and statistical
regularities do in fact occur around the boundaries of intentional acts, bottom-up
processing alone cannot account for the human ability to interpret observed behavior.
This is because "the surface flow of motion people produce in most, if not all, cases
is consistent with a multitude of different intentions" (p.1 75 [10]). In other words,
one can walk towards an object, or even pick it up, for any number of reasons. In
order to decide between competing candidate intentions, humans must turn to other
sources of knowledge, potentially including their own behavior systems.
Intentionality in Animals
Although there is more controversy surrounding the extent to which non-human ani-
mals understand intentionality, there is evidence that they can at least take advantage
of information about another animal's point-of-view. At the simplest level, many pri-
mate species demonstrate gaze-following behavior [112]. Chimpanzees in particular
are able to follow human gaze around obstacles and past distractors, adjusting their
position and checking back with the gazing model repeatedly to determine their ob-
ject of attention [115]. Similarly, when tested in a competitive setting, chimpanzees
have been shown to understand what other chimpanzees can and cannot see, and
make judgments about which food sources to pursue accordingly [58] [59] [113].
While it is not entirely clear whether these types of behaviors result from a primi-
tive theory of mind, Whiten [120] makes a compelling argument for where the transi-
tion between behavior-reading and mind-reading begins. Whiten posits that, at their
simplest, mental-states can be seen as intervening variables between observable be-
haviors. Figure 2-2 gives an example of the use of an internal variable. In a case such
Y x tercl YePhmts
w atc h e > aW s a ctan
x aeom h moe Y CODESWho he meat AS X ae Xn oa
r e n up mon m tnc2X e vr ene t eni, al i to athe ffeet i AS APPROACH Wli CARE
X~~~~ b o W metS
ab nit inereata x'sn oome mayto be
who come near m idr means o an er ernnne e
2.2. Frm SoialAnim ls oS canlsChaaters
> BE SCEPTICAL
T crtps she can fond
GWin X n"a may
of ocil larnng i huasnnnhua aimas. Furthiermranubro
with meat d x 3. GNVE MEAT
Figure 2-2: This is a hypothetical example, where primate Y watches primate X.
By positing an internal state of 'wanting' in primate X, Y can gain economy of
representation (from Whiten 1996 [120]).
as in figure 2-2, there are enough potential cause and effect behaviors, that positing
an internal variable can be very beneficial to the animal, allowing it to avoid having
to learn each of the different individual cause and effect links. An animal using such
an internal variable in its interpretation of another's action could be said to have
moved from behavior-reading to mind-reading. Whiten therefore suggests that mind-
reading becomes a useful strategy exactly at the point where behavior is so complex
and varied that it is difficult to interpret without positing any intervening invisible
states or variables.
2.2.6 From Social Animals to Social Characters
The cognitive literature provides compelling evidence for the presence and usefulness
of social learning in human and non-human animals. Furthermore, a number of
themes can be seen in the animal behavior and infant development studies described
here, which can be used to guide our design of socially capable artificial creatures.
Multiple Levels of Social Learning. Social learning and imitation may happen
at many levels of behavioral granularity.
Multiple Sources of Information. There are multiple sources of information con-
tained in an action, and each provides opportunities for different kinds of social
learning.
Motivationally-driven Action Hierarchies. One possible way in which to repre-
sent multiple sources of information and multiple levels of behavioral granularity
is by using a motivationally-driven hierarchical action structure.
Simulation Theory. Simulation Theory, where the creature uses itself to help in-
terpret another's behavior, may be an especially useful approach to developing
social abilities.
Perception-Production Coupling. A Simulation Theory-style social learning sys-
tem may have a perception-production coupling mechanism, such as mirror
neurons, behind it.
Bootstrapping from Imitation. Being able to identify and imitate another's be-
havior may be the first step towards more complex interpretation of that be-
havior.
With these points in mind, the goal of this thesis can now be further refined. The aim
of this work is not only to create synthetic characters capable of social learning, but
to do so using a cognitively inspired approach. In particular, we would like to explore
the mechanisms by which Simulation Theory can be used by one character to learn
from another's behavior. Our implementation of a simulation-theoretic social learning
system will take advantage of the hierarchical action system used by our creatures,
and attempt to exploit the multiple levels of social learning and multiple sources of
observational information available. Finally, we will use the ability to recognize and
reproduce observed movements as the starting point for developing more complex
social skills, such as identifying simple motivations and goals, and learning about
objects in the environment.
Chapter 3
Background and Related Work
Note: Portions of this chapter are reprinted or adapted from [28].
The fascinatingly rich array of animal social behavior has provided frequent inspira-
tion to the artificial intelligence community. Some of the first research into multi-agent
systems has occurred in the fields of swarm intelligence [24] and distributed robotic
systems [96], which draw inspiration from the complex societies of social insects. Sim-
ilarly, bird flocking behavior gave rise to Reynolds' now classic Boids [97], along with
related works such as Tu's modeling of schools of fish [117).
In their comprehensive review of socially interactive robots, Fong et al. [51] point
out that what is common to approaches such as those described thus far, is that the
individual participants are anonymous and interchangeable. The group behavior is
self-organizing, and does not require individuals to differentiate between each other,
learn from each other, or form individual relationships. Fong et al call this type of
agent or robot "group social" and distinguish them from "individual social" robots
which are defined as:
embodied agents that are part of a heterogeneous group: a society of
robots or humans. They are able to recognize each other and engage in
social interactions, they possess histories (perceive and interpret the world
in terms of their own experience), and they explicitly communicate with
and learn from each other. (p. 14 4 [51]).
This thesis is concerned with working towards exactly this sort of socially intelligent
artificial creature-characters able to learn about each other and their environment
through social interactions. In this section, I will highlight related work in devel-
oping socially interactive characters and robots, focusing especially on prior work in
imitative artificial creatures.
3.1 Social characters and robots
3.1.1 Interactive Animated Characters
Much of the previous work done by the Synthetic Characters Group has focused on
creating animated synthetic creatures who interact with humans and each other in
a compelling and believable manner. Some of the first work in ethologically inspired
interactive characters was pioneered by Blumberg [18]. The cognitive architecture
developed by Blumberg was used in the ALIVE installation [22], where human par-
ticipants saw themselves projected into a virtual world featuring an animated dog
named Silas. The ALIVE system was able to recover the locations of the partici-
pant's head, hands and feet, and could also do simple gesture recognition, allowing
Silas to respond to gestural commands for behaviors such as sit and shake. Silas
could also interact with the participant based on his own motivations, for instance
by bringing a ball to the person's hand if his desire to fetch was high. A major
contribution of this work was to introduce the idea of a hierarchical action system
composed of competing motivational subsystems as a behavior selection mechanism
for autonomous characters, an idea inspired by the ethological literature (as discussed
in section 2.1.1).
In more recent work, the group created the Alphawolf installation [116] (shown in
figure 3-1), a project focusing on the social dynamics of a semi-autonomous wolf pack.
In Alphawolf, human participants could assume the role of one of three wolf pups,
and could control the pup's actions by howling, growling, whimpering or barking
into a microphone. Based on their human-influenced interactions with each other,
Figure 3-1: two wolf pups in the Alphawolf installation interacting.
the pups would form a dominance hierarchy, and develop emotional memories of one
another, representing how dominant or submissive they felt towards the other pups.
This project was one of the first to explore enduring social memories in artificial
characters, and continued the Synthetic Characters tradition of exploring human
control of intelligent artificial creatures [68] [20].
Other Systems
Other researchers have also addressed the problem of creating believable and life-
like animated characters. These include Perlin and Goldberg's pioneering IMPROV
system [91], which allows synthetic actors to move naturally in response to relatively
high-level human direction. Badler and colleagues have done significant research
developing 3D characters capable of executing complex actions in response to natural
language instructions. To this end, they have developed the Parameterized Action
Representation (PAR), meant to be the conceptual bridge between natural-language
instructions and carrying out a particular action [8]. Besides the action itself, a
PAR consists of the agent meant to carry out the action, conditions under which the
action may be performed, expected results of the action, possible subactions, and
objects to perform the action on-it can thus be seen as somewhat analogous to the
action tuples used in our system and described in section 5.6. Badler's group has
also developed numerous other tools for expressive character animation, including
the EMOTE system, which allows the emotional appearance of a character's motion
and facial expressions to be easily modified [7].
While both Badler and Perlin's systems contain a strong set of tools for creating
expressive characters, the focus of both these works is primarily on life-like appearance
rather than life-like cognition, whereas this thesis is more concerned with the latter,
in the hope that it leads to the former.
3.1.2 Social Robots
Over the years, a number of robotic systems have been designed for the express
purpose of exploring human-robot social interactions, and perhaps the most well
known of these is Breazeal's Kismet [25] [27] (shown in figure 3-2). Built to model the
Figure 3-2: Kismet.
interactions between human infants and their caregivers, Kismet has an expressive
high degree of freedom face, with exaggerated, cartoon-like features, and no body.
Kismet's baby-like appearance, as well as its behavior, was specifically designed to
both encourage and take advantage of the kinds of social exchanges that human
infants and their caretakers typically participate in. In particular, Kismet engages
users in turn-taking games and conversations, has human-like emotional responses
to tone of voice, and can regulate interactions with humans by altering its level
of engagement-slowing down or withdrawing from the interaction if it became over-
stimulated, or seeking out human attention when left alone. At the heart of Breazeal's
Kismet research is the idea (discussed in section 2.2.3) that the caregiving behaviors
people offer infants act as a scaffolding for infant social learning. Robots that elicit
these same sorts of behaviors might similarly be able to use them to bootstrap better
understanding of the humans in their world.
In a similar vein, Scassellati's work with the robot Cog [102] looked at how different
theories of theory of mind presented in the cognitive literature could be implemented
in a humanoid robot. Much of Scasselatti's research focused on implementing the
low-level abilities suggested by the cognitive literature, such as face tracking and
recognition, as well as more advanced skills such as gaze-following and joint attention.
Roy's research has focused on creating interactive robots whose understanding of
the world around them helps ground their understanding of natural language. The
most sophisticated of these robots to date is Ripley [100] (pictured in figure 3-3), a
7 degree of freedom robot capable of a variety of complex linguistic interactions with
human users. In the context of developing sophisticated language abilities, a number
of mental models for representing the people and objects in its environment have been
developed for Ripley [101].
Figure 3-3: The robot Ripley (image taken from www.media.mit.edu/cogmac)
3.2 Imitative characters and robots
In recent years, a number of robotic and animated characters, with a variety of
imitative abilities, have been developed (for a partial review see [31] and [104]), some
of them using biologically inspired approaches [28] [30] [77] [46] [12]. Often, this work
has emphasized the creation of systems able to mimic the particular form of individual
actions, focusing on the physical performance of the robot or character, rather than
on gaining social or environmental knowledge. Some researchers have focused on
using imitation to allow robots to learn interpersonal communication protocols, either
from other robots or from human instructors [13] [11]. However, this work has taken
relatively little advantage of other types of social learning that are present in animals,
especially with regard to possible shared mechanisms between simpler social learning
behaviors and mind-reading abilities. Overall, the path towards creating socially
intelligent agents is still largely uncharted, especially within the framework of a larger
cognitive architecture.
3.2.1 Learning new actions
Many imitative systems have been designed with the aim of using imitation to con-
strain the problem of learning which actions to perform in what situations, a problem
generally termed state-action space discovery. Some of the earliest work in this area
is called learning by demonstration. In this approach, the robot (often a robotic ma-
nipulator) learns how to perform a new task by watching a human perform the same
task. This may or may not involve literal mimicking of the human's behavior. In the
case where it does not, called task-level imitation, the robot learns how to perform
the physical task of the demonstrator-such as stacking blocks [71] or peg insertion
[63]-without imitating the specific movements of the demonstrator. Instead, the
robot acquires a high-level task model, such as a hierarchy of goal states and the ac-
tions to achieve them, from observing the effects of human movements on objects in
the environment. Task-level imitation can be seen as somewhat analogous to the pro-
cesses of emulation or perhaps program-level imitation seen in animals (discussed in
chapter 2). The characters implemented in the context of this thesis are also capable
of picking out the goal-states of others, however this implementation uses Simulation
Theory, rather than simply observing and replicating changes to the environment (for
further discussion, see chapter 6).
In other work with highly articulated humanoid robots, learning by demonstration
has been explored as a way to achieve efficient learning of dexterous motor skills [5]
[103]. The state-action space for such robots is too prohibitively large to search for
a particular solution in reasonable time. To address this issue, the robot observes
the human's performance, using both object and human movement information to
estimate a control policy for the desired task. The human's demonstration helps to
guide the robot's search through the space, providing it with a good region to initiate
its own search. If given knowledge of the task goal (in the form of an evaluation
function), robots have learned to perform a variety of physical tasks-e.g., learning
the game of "ball in cup" , or a tennis forehand [89] [881, by utilizing both the demon-
strator's movement and that of the object. We are also interested in the problems
of action and state-action space discovery, and think imitation is a very worthwhile
approach to this task. However, the main focus of this work is on developing charac-
ters with a better understanding of others and of their environment, rather than on
the learning of novel actions (for previous work by the Synthetic Characters Group
on action and state-action space discovery see [21]).
Another way to accelerate learning is to encode the state-action space using a
more compact representation. This makes the overall state-action space smaller and
therefore faster to explore. Researchers have used biologically-inspired representations
of movement, such as movement primitives [17] [78], to encode movements in terms of
goal-directed behaviors rather than discrete joint angles. Primitives allow movement
trajectories to be encoded using fewer parameters and are combined to produce the
entire movement repertoire. The tradeoff of this compact representation is loss of
granularity and/or generality of the movement space. As a result, more recent work
has focused on using imitation as a way of acquiring new primitives (as new sequences
or combinations of existing primitives) that can be added to the repertoire [67] [50].
As will be discussed in section 5.7 and chapter 6, the system described in this thesis
also incorporates the idea of movement primitives and goal-directed behaviors, which
can be added to and adapted at run-time.
Recently, Lieberman [75] developed a system for teaching a humanoid robot dex-
terous motor skills through human demonstration, and for automatically parsing ob-
served motion streams into individual skills. Lieberman's system takes an intentional
approach to action parsing, analyzing motion and end-effector position with respect
to objects in the environment, in order to find the intentional boundaries of move-
ments. His system is also able to develop new motion spaces by correctly editing and
combining multiple differing examples of a task-oriented movement (e.g. picking up
a cup from a number of different angles) and interpolating between them (for more
information on motion spaces created by interpolating multiple animations, see the
discussion of blended animations in section 5.7.3).
3.2.2 Learning to imitate
In learning to imitate, the robot learns how to solve what is know as the corre-
spondence problem through experience (i.e., how to map the observed movement of
another onto the character's own movement repertoire). One strategy for solving the
correspondence problem is to represent the demonstrator's movement trajectory in
the coordinate frame of the imitator's own motor coordinates. This approach was
explored by Billard and Schaal [14] who recorded human arm movement data using
a Sarcos SenSuit and then projected that data into an intrinsic frame of reference for
a 41 degree-of-freedom humanoid simulation.
Another approach, the use of perceptual-motor primitives [118] [67], is inspired by
the discovery of mirror neurons in primates. These neurons are active both when a
goal-oriented action is observed and when the same action is performed (recall section
2.2.4). Mataric [77] implements this idea as an on-line encoding process, that maps
observed joint angles onto movement primitives to allow a simulated upper torso
humanoid to learn to imitate a sequence of arm trajectories.
Others have adapted the notion of mirror neurons to predictive forward models
[126]. For instance, Demiris and Hayes [46] present a technique that emphasizes the
bi-directional interaction between perception and action, where movement recogni-
tion is carried out by the movement generating mechanisms. To accomplish this, a
forward model for a behavior is built directly into the behavior module responsible
for producing that movement. In model-based imitation learning, the imitator's mo-
tor acts are represented in task space where they can be directly compared with the
observed trajectory. Using this approach, Atkeson and Schaal [4] show how a forward
model and a priori knowledge of the task goal can be used to acquire a task-level
policy from reinforcement learning in very few trials. They demonstrated an anthro-
pomorphic robot learning how to perform a pole-balancing task in a single trial and
a pendulum swing up task in three to four trials [4] [5].
As discussed in section 2.2.4, our implementation is also inspired by the possible
role that mirror neurons play in imitative behavior. In the approaches described
above, mirror neuron-inspired mechanisms are an on-line process for either mapping
perceived movements to another coordinate frame, or are a forward model that is
directly involved in generating the observed action. In contrast, our implementation
is consistent with that discussed in Oztop and Arbib [90] and Meltzoff and Decety
[85], where mirror neurons are believed to represent observed movement in terms of
the creature's own motor coordinates. This concept of explicit representation (i.e.
memory) is important in order to capture the goal-directed match-to-target search
that characterizes exploratory imitative behavior of infants [87]. It is also important
in order to account for the ability of young infants to imitate deferred actions after a
substantial time delay (on the order hours and even days) that Meltzoff has observed
[81] [82] .
Finally, the correspondence problem has also been addressed in the animation and
motion capture literature, where it is known as the problem of retargetting [55], or
taking motion capture or animation data from one character and using it to animate
another character of differing size. Some particularly interesting work in this area
has been done by Bindiganavale [16], whose CaPAR system parses motion capture
data into hierarchical goal-directed action units, which can then be played out on a
new character after only a single example. However, this work is approached from a
very different vantage point than our own, since its goal is primarily to allow more
flexible use of motion capture or animation material, rather than on giving synthetic
characters additional cognitive functionality. As a result, this approach does not take
advantage of already existing cognitive mechanisms within the characters, who are
viewed primarily as directed actors rather than independent agents.
3.2.3 Learning by imitation
Imitative behavior can either be learned or specified a priori. In learning by imitation,
the robot is given the ability to engage in imitative behavior. This serves as a mecha-
nism that bootstraps further learning and understanding from guided exploration by
following a model. Initial studies of this style of social learning in robotics focused on
allowing one robot to learn reactive control policies to navigate through mazes [60]
or an unknown landscape [41] by using simple perception (proximity and infrared
sensors) to follow another robot that was adept at maneuvering in the environment.
This approach has also been applied to allow a robot to learn inter-personal commu-
nication protocols between similar robots, between robots with similar morphology
but which differ in scale [12], and with a human instructor [11]..
Learning by imitation often advocates an "empathic" or direct experiential ap-
proach to social understanding whereby a robot uses its internal mechanisms to assim-
ilate or adopt the internal state of the other as its own [41] [70]. Given our discussion
in section 2.2.1, we also advocate a simulation theoretic approach to achieve social un-
derstanding of people by robots and animated characters. However, a pure empathic
understanding where the character simply "absorbs" the experience, and does not dis-
tinguish it as arising from self, or being communicated by others, is not sufficient for
human-style social intelligence. For many forms of social learning, the character must
be able to determine what is held in common and what is not-these include social
referencing, and cooperative and competitive activities, where separating your own
knowledge from the knowledge of the other is especially paramount. In our approach,
the character can use its own cognitive and affective mechanisms as a "simulator"
for inferring the other's internal states, which are represented as distinct from the
character's own states.
3.2.4 Towards Socially Intelligent Characters and Robots
Recently, a number of projects by the Robotic Life Group at the MIT Media Lab
have begun addressing the problem of creating socially intelligent robots, focusing es-
pecially on the development of robots who can cooperate with humans. In particular,
the group's expressive humanoid robot, Leonardo, can learn a number of collabora-
tive button-pressing tasks, using human guidance to quicken the learning process [291.
The robot forms and refines hypotheses about the goals of the task by listening and re-
sponding to verbal instruction, observing human gesture (e.g. pointing), and looking
at changes in the environment (e.g. which buttons have changed state) [76]. Subse-
quently, the robot can perform the task collaboratively with the human, completing
some of the task goals, while allowing the human to complete others. Throughout
the interaction, the robot uses communicative gestures to aid the learning and col-
laboration processes. Similarly, Leonardo can also be taught games to play with the
human instructor [32]. In the case of competitive games, this requires Leonardo to
know that the human's goal in the task is different than his own, necessitating an
explicit representation of self and other's goals.
In other work with the robot Leonardo, we created a cognitively-inspired facial
imitation architecture. Our implementation was heavily inspired by the imitative
interactions human infants and their caregivers frequently engage in [84], and by the
Active Intermodal Mapping (AIM) theory of facial imitation proposed by Meltzoff and
Moore [87]. AIM suggests that a combination of innate knowledge and specialized
learning mechanisms underlie infants ability to imitate. Specifically, AIM proposes
that infants have an innate ability to recognize other's facial organs, and that they
map their own movements, and the movements they observe, onto the same internal
representation (hence, intermodal mapping). In other words, AIM presents a model
for the implementation of Simulation Theory via perception-production coupling in
infant facial imitation (for more details on the AIM model, see for example Meltzoff
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Figure 3-4: An animated version of the Leonardo robot imitates a human model's
facial expressions.
and Moore 1997 [87]).
In this implementation, an animated version of Leonardo is able to learn the corre-
spondence between his own facial features and those of a human model by having the
human imitate him. Subsequently, he is able to imitate the human's facial expression
(shown in figure 3-4). This ability was then used to help bootstrap social referencing
capabilities in the robot, where the robot used the emotions typically associated with
its own facial expressions to judge the emotional stance of a human model towards
objects in the environment, and respond accordingly.
The implementation of facial expression mimicry in Leonardo was an important
first step towards creating a robot with Simulation Theory-style social learning abil-
ities. It demonstrated that social learning skills, such as social referencing, could
be bootstrapped from facial imitation abilities. However, in this implementation,
Leonardo's imitative abilities were limited to static facial expressions, and the Sim-
ulation Theory he employed occurred only at the level of his movement primitives.
This thesis takes many of the ideas introduced in that work further, creating a social
learning system that applies Sirmulation Theory at the level of goal-directed actions as
well as movements, allowing the characters presented here to imitate whole gestures
and movements, identify simple motivations and goals for other's actions and learn
about objects in the environment by watching others interact with them. In the next
chapter, I will use the test characters Max and Morris Mouse (who will be the focus
of the remainder of this thesis) to present the full spectrum of social learning abilities
implemented in this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Max and Morris
Max the Mouse and his friend Morris (pictured together in their virtual environment
in figure 4-1), are two anthropomorphic animated mouse characters, and the testbed
for the Simulation Theory-based social learning system presented in this thesis. Max
Figure 4-1: Max (right) and Morris (left) in the virtual desert
and Morris inhabit a rather minimalist graphical world, populated only by themselves,
and sometimes containing a small number of simple objects representing food and toys
(see figure 4-2) They star in a number of small interactive demonstrations, meant
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Figure 4-2: The objects that can be introduced into the world.
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Figure 4-3: Visualizer showing the current level of Max's hunger and play drives
to test and exhibit the imitative and social learning capabilities implemented in this
work. In this chapter, I will present an overview of these demonstrations, and describe
Max and Morris's behavior, in order to ground the discussion of architecture and
implementation in the remainder of the thesis. Videos of interactions similar to the
sample interactions described below will be available at
www.media.mit.edu/~daphna/thesisvideos.html
4.1 Sample Interaction :The Basics
Max and Morris start out facing each other in the middle of a barren desert (they
are the last of the little known sahara mouse species Unluckius rattus). A Drive
visualizer visible on screen shows that Max's levels of playfulness and hunger are
both high (pictured in figure 4-3), and the same is true for Morris. However, there
are no food or toy objects available in the environment (as of yet, there are no objects
in the environment at all), and Max and Morris begin to pace.
As shown in figure 4-2 there are a small number of objects which can be intro-
Figure 4-4: Buttons for introducing objects into the world
Figure 4-5: Max (left) and Morris (right) jumping for a piece of cheese
duced into the world, by choosing among corresponding labeled buttons (figure 4-4).
Pressing any of the buttons causes an object of that type to appear in the world, hov-
ering over the mice's heads, and a corresponding array of sliders, which manipulate
the object's location, to appear in the button panel. In this case, a piece of cheese is
introduced.
As soon as the piece of cheese is added to the world, both mice stop pacing and
navigate over to it. They then begin jumping for the cheese (seen in figure 4-5).
As the cheese is manipulated - lowered down, moved sideways - they adjust their
jumping direction and orientation, and begin reaching instead of jumping when the
cheese is closer to them. Eventually, the cheese is moved so that it is close enough for
Max to get it. Max eats the cheese, it disappears and Max's level of hunger in the
Drive visualizer drops. While Max was eating the cheese, Morris continued reaching
for it, but he stops reaching for it once it is gone.
Next, a ball is added to the world, and both mice begin to reach for it. However,
after a new piece of cheese is also introduced, Morris, whose level of hunger is still
high, switches to jumping for the cheese, while Max continues jumping for the ball.
Finally, after some time has elapsed, Max's level of hunger is high again, and he too
begins to reach for the cheese.
4.2 Sample Interaction: Imitation
As before, Max and Morris start out facing each other in an otherwise empty world.
This time, no objects are introduced, and instead Max is instructed to observe Morris.
Max orients towards Morris and, as he does so, a graphical window displaying the
world from Max's perspective shows a stick figure version of Morris coming into view
(figure 4-6). In the window that represents Max's viewpoint a number of Morris's
joints, such as his hands, nose and feet, are marked with colored spheres.
Figure 4-6: Morris, rendered from Max's point of view. Certain key effectors, such as
Morris's hands, nose and feet, are marked by colored sphere's
There is also a panel of buttons available, labeled with a variety of possible move-
ments such as wave, poundGround, coverEyes, jump and thumbsUp (figure 4-7). The
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Figure 4-7: Buttons for requesting that Morris perform different movements
Figure 4-8: Buttons for requesting that Max observe, imitate or identify Morris's
action
version of Morris used in this interaction is somewhat different than the previous
Morris-he must perform any movement chosen from the button panel. As described
in appendix B, a movement is simply an individual motion primitive or gesture. In
this case, the button labeled jump is chosen, and as Morris jumps up into the air
Max adjusts his gaze so that Morris stays in view.
Once Morris has landed Max is asked to imitate the movement he last saw Morris
perform (see figure 4-8). Based on his observation of Morris, Max finds the movement
he knows how to perform that is closest to what he saw, and begins to jump into
the air. Next, Morris is told to cover his face. As Morris raises his arms to cover his
face, a number of the colored spheres marking his joints become obscured from Max's
perspective (see figure 4-9). Nevertheless, Max correctly reproduces the movement
when asked to imitate it (figure 4-10).
4.3 Sample Interaction: Action Identification
Once again, Max and Morris face off in the desert. As in the first scenario, they both
have high levels of playfulness and hunger. A ball is added to the world and Max
is instructed to observe Morris, who begins jumping for the ball. This time, Max is
asked to identify the action Morris is performing, which he does by also beginning to
jump for the ball.
Figure 4-9: Morris covering his eyes, as seen by Max. Notice that some of the spheres
marking his body parts are not visible (compare to figure 4-6)
While a movement is an individual motion primitive, an action is a movement
or series of movements placed in an environmental and motivational context. Move-
ments represent stand-alone physical motion, while actions are behaviors performed
in response to environmental triggers, motivational drives and desired goals states
(see appendix B for more details). Max identifies Morris's jumping action, by looking
for actions in his own behavior system that use the jumping movement. In this case,
he finds that jumping is used to get objects, and that toys such as balls satisfy his
play drive. By jumping for the ball, Max shows that he knows that Morris is trying
to get the ball, and that he is doing this in order to satisfy his play drive.
A second object is added to the environment, a piece of cheese. The cheese is
lowered down closer to Morris and Morris stops jumping for the ball and begins
reaching for the cheese. Max is again asked to identify Morris's action, and begins
reaching for the cheese (not the ball) as well. By doing so, Max indicates not only
that he knows Morris is reaching, but that he is trying to get the cheese because his
level of hunger is high.
Now, the cheese is brought even closer to Morris so that he is able to reach it
and eat it. When asked to identify Morris's action, Max mimics eating, correctly
identifying Morris's action even though the cheese, having been eaten by Morris, is
no longer there.
4.4 Sample Interaction: Learning About Objects I
In this interaction an object we haven't seen before is introduced, an ice cream cone.
Morris begins to reach for the ice cream cone, but Max, who doesn't 'know' that ice
cream is edible (or useful for anything at all), does not attend to the ice cream.
Once again, Max is asked to observe Morris, and identify his action. Max shrugs,
indicating that he doesn't know why Morris is reaching (since, to him, the ice cream
has no purpose). The ice cream is given to Morris, who eats it. Max is again asked
to identify Morris's action, and this time, he mimes eating. Now, when another ice
cream cone is added to the environment, Max immediately orients to it and begins
reaching for it. When he is given the ice cream he eats it, having learned that ice
cream is edible.
4.5 Sample Interaction: Learning About Objects II
While there is only one way for Max and Morris to eat food-by consuming it, there
are a number of ways in which they play with toys. When Max or Morris is given a
ball, they toss it up and down in the air. When one of them is given a baton, they
dance in a circle with it. Both these actions reduce their level of playfulness.
Here, another new object is introduced, a cube-shaped tossing toy. As with the
ice cream, Morris knows how to use this toy, but Max does not know its purpose.
Morris is given the cube, and begins tossing it, while Max is again told to observe
and identify his actions. Subsequently, when Max's level of playfulness is high, he
reaches for the cube, and when he is given the cube he begins tossing it. Here, Max
has learned not only that he can play with the cube, but how to play with it.
4.6 Looking Ahead
In this chapter, I introduced Max and Morris Mouse, and described some typical
interactions and behavior patterns for them. In the next chapter, I will describe the
overall cognitive architecture underlying their behavior, while in chapter 6 I'll go into
the details of their implementation.
IFigure 4-10: First row. Morris (blue) demonstrates an action (covering his eyes) while
Max (brown) watches. Second row: Morris through Maxs eyes. The colored spheres
represent key effectors. Third row. Max reproduces Morriss action, by performing
the movements in his own repertoire that are closest to what he observed.
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Chapter 5
Cognitive Architecture
Max and Morris Mouse are the latest in long line of interactive animated characters
developed by the Synthetic Characters Group at the MIT Media Lab [68] [20] [116]
[21] [66]. They were built using the Synthetic Characters C5m toolkit, a specialized
set of libraries for building autonomous, adaptive characters and robots. The toolkit
contains a complete cognitive architecture (or "virtual brain") for synthetic characters
(diagrammed in figure 5-1), including perception, action, belief, motor and navigation
systems, as well as a high performance graphics layer for doing Java-based OpenGL
3D Graphics. All of the work described in this thesis was implemented under the
C5m system.
Several thorough introductions to the Synthetic Characters toolkit have already
been written [21] [34] [65], so I will only present a relatively brief introduction here,
focusing particularly on functionality added especially for this work, and on the im-
plementation details of the characters and architectures specific to this thesis.
5.1 System Overview
Figure 5-2 presents a high-level overview of the C5m system. The central component
is the World, which represents the "ground-truth" of the environment the characters
exist and operate in. The World keeps track of all the creatures and other physical
objects in the synthetic environment, and coordinates all communication and data
The World
Figure 5-1: This is the overall cognitive architecture used for characters such as Max
and Morris. The systems are processed serially, in roughly top-to-bottom (or light-to-
dark) order, relative to this figure. Imitation, and other social skills, make particular
use of the perception, action and motor systems. (Adapted from Burke 2001 [34])
transfer between creatures, objects, and input devices. Input devices are anything
that provides sensory information, including standard interfaces such as keyboards,
mice and joysticks, as well as optional microphones, cameras and other physical sen-
sors (e.g. pressure sensors for a robot). Creatures and other objects are also input
devices, since they provide sensory information to each other. The World and all
its objects are optionally hooked up to a graphical front-end, however objects in the
synthetic world are not required to have a graphical representation.
5.2 Input to the System
The World collects messages called data records from input devices, and distributes
them to creatures. Data records are used extensively throughout the system, and
represent sensory information that the creatures may perceive and act upon. For
example, a data record might contain symbolic visual information, such as a creature's
Figure 5-2: An overview of the Synthetic Character's System (After Isla 2001 [65])
current position and "shape", which each creature posts every timestep. Alternatively,
it could contain user-input information that the creatures then "perceive" (e.g. button
presses, auditory input). Data records are also produced internally by sensors in
the creature's sensory system (described in section 5.3), allowing passively collected
sensory information handed in by the World (e.g. symbolic vision) and actively
collected sensory information sensed by the creature (e.g. synthetic vision, described
in section 5.3.1) to be processed by the same perceptual mechanisms down the line.
5.3 Sensory System
A creature's sensory system is composed of sensors, which are responsible for gath-
ering and filtering a particular type of sensory data. The simplest of these are input
sensors, each of which is paired with an input device. Every timestep, the World
collects data records from each input device, and makes them available to any input
sensor registered to receive data records from that device. The input sensor then
filters these records to enforce sensory honesty. Specifically, the input sensor filters
out sensory information that should not be perceivable by the creature, for example
visual events that occur behind the creature. Sensors may also perform additional
processing on the data, such as low-pass filtering of position information, or even
performing sophisticated pattern recognition algorithms on video input.
Another kind of sensory information worth mentioning is proprioceptive input.
Proprioceptive sensors assimilate information about the creature's current state, which
has been posted to working memory (a sort of internal blackboard), by the creature's
other systems. Of particular importance to the work in this thesis is proprioceptive
body pose information-the creature's sense of where in space its body parts are
currently located.
5.3.1 Synthetic Vision
For this thesis, another kind of sensor, the synthetic vision sensor, was implemented
(the implementation is almost identical to that used by Isla, and described in [65]).
Learning by observation is an inherently visual process, and using synthetic vision,
where the character "sees" the world graphically rendered from its own perspective,
forces us to grapple with the problems of gesture and movement recognition in a more
honest and biologically plausible manner than in a system that uses only symbolic
visual information.
The Synthetic Characters group has used synthetic vision in a number of previous
projects [19] [66]. For my thesis, I used a simple form of color-coded synthetic vision,
shown in figure 5-3. This type of Synthetic Vision has been used previously, for
example in [117]. Each timestep, the synthetic vision sensor takes as input a graphical
rendering of the world from the position and orientation of the creature's eye. This
rendering is typically a color-coded view of the world, in which each object is assigned
a unique color, which can be used as an identifying tag. By scanning the visual image
for pixels of a particular color, the creature can "see" an object. However, just as
with real vision, objects that are obstructed or out of view cannot be seen.
Besides determining whether an object is obstructed or visible, the other impor-
tant function of the synthetic vision sensor is to determine object location. A simple
approximate location can be extracted visually by examining the screen-space coor-
dinates of an object's centroid in the point-of-view rendering. The (x, y) screen-space
coordinates can then be combined with information from the rendering" s depth-buffer,
in order to determine the location of the object in the coordinate frame of the crea-
Figure 5-3: This figure shows Morris in 3 poses. The top row is Morris as we see
him, while the bottom row is Morris as seen through Max's synthetic vision. The
colored spheres on Morris's body are key body parts whose location is tracked by the
synthetic vision system.
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Figure 5-4: A simple example percept tree.
ture's eye (i.e. the object's location from the creature's perspective). See appendix
A for the mathematical formulas involved. The specific use of synthetic vision in this
thesis is discussed in section 6.1.
5.4 Perception System
Once the sensory system has finished filtering the incoming data records it passes
them into the perception system, where they are processed by the percept tree. The
percept tree is a hierarchical mechanism used to extract state and feature information
from sensory input. Each node in the tree is called a percept, with more specific
percepts closer to the leaves. Percepts are atomic perception units, with arbitrarily
complex logic, whose job is to recognize and extract features from raw sensory data.
The simplest of these are symbolic percepts, which simply match symbolic input about
different objects in the world. For example, a symbolic shape percept might simply
recognize anything with a "shape", while its children might recognize the presence
of specific shapes, such as a ball, a piece of cheese, or a mouse. Percepts can also
perform more complex recognition tasks, such as pose and utterance classification
(described in [21]). The root of the tree is the most general percept, which we call
True. An example percept tree is shown in figure 5-4.
As a data record is pushed through the percept tree, each percept is given the
opportunity to examine the record's contents. The percept then does four things:
" Returns a float between 0 and 1 indicating whether it "matched" the data in the
data record-that is, whether the data record contained the feature information
the percept was looking for. For symbolic percepts this match value is generally
either 0 or 1 (e.g. the data record is either "ball shaped" or it isn't), but other
percepts, such as classifier percepts or vision based percepts, might return a
number in between, depending on how close the input is to their model.
" Returns a "confidence" between 0 and 1, representing how accurate it feels its
"match" evaluation is. Symbolic percepts almost always have a confidence of
1, since there is no uncertainty in the data they receive. However, percepts
using potentially noisy data (e.g. auditory and visual input) might return other
confidence values.
" Optionally stores results computed from the incoming data. For instance, a
location percept, which receives input in the coordinate frame of the character's
eye might choose to store it in other coordinate frames as well, such as relative
to the center of the character's body, or in world coordinates.
" Decides whether to pass the data record along to its children for them to eval-
uate. In general, percepts pass data on to their children when they themselves
have matched that data, and don't pass it on when they haven't. If an incoming
data record has no "shape", then it certainly won't have a "ball shape" or a
"cheese shape".
All the data from a particular percept's evaluation of a data record-match, con-
fidence and any additional results it wants to store, are collected in a time-stamped
percept evaluation, and all the percept evaluations of a particular input data record
together form a belief about that data record, and are passed into the character's
belief system, to be integrated with previous perceptual input, in a process described
in section 5.5.
5.5 Belief System
A character's belief system stores its perceptual history, organized into beliefs about
different objects in the world. A belief represents a character's knowledge about the
feature history of a particular object-where it's been, what it looks like, what it's
said, and so on. Beliefs come into the belief system from the perception system and
are first merged with each other, and then with other already existing beliefs.
For example, the same object in the world, let's say another character, might
have a number of data records associated with it. It might put out its own data
record containing symbolic information about its shape and location. Meanwhile,
the synthetic vision sensor might generate a visual data record about the location
of certain color-coded body parts on this character's body. These data records go
through the percept tree separately, and initially result in two different beliefs. How-
ever, since they originate from the same object in the world, the data in these two
data records must be combined, and any conflicts in the data between the two (for
instance differing position information) resolved.
Beliefs are combined with each other using merge metrics which are used to com-
pare all the incoming beliefs to each other. Merge metrics simply evaluate whether
they believe two beliefs originated from the same object or not. While merge metrics
can use any mechanism to compare beliefs, the most common methods used are look-
ing at position ("are these beliefs coming from the same place in the world?") and
shape ("do these two beliefs come from objects with the same shape?"). When two
beliefs are merged the more reliable of any conflicting data is retained (i.e. the data
with the higher confidence values).
Once the incoming beliefs have been merged with each other, they are added to
the already existing beliefs in the system. While the incoming beliefs represent what
we call a percept tree snapshot-the percept evaluations of an object for a particular
timestep-the beliefs already in the system represent the character's knowledge of an
object over a period of time. Beliefs contain percept histories, which store the match,
confidence and associated data returned by each percept, with respect to that object,
per timestep, over a predetermined history length. While it is up to the percept
history as to how to store this data, the simplest mechanism is to just store all the
time-stamped percept evaluations. New beliefs are merged into old using the same
merge metrics used to combine new beliefs with each other.
5.5.1 Belief Selectors
When other systems, such as the action system, want access to information stored
in the belief system they are able to use a system of belief selectors. Belief selectors
search the belief system for beliefs about objects that fit particular criteria-generally
beliefs that match a specified combination of percepts or percept data, for a particular
point in time. For instance, a belief selector might be used to find a belief about an
object that matched cheese shape 2 seconds ago. A belief selector could also be used
to find all the beliefs about objects that matched the food percept, and then to select
the one among those that's currently closest to character's hands.
5.5.2 Derived Percepts
One particularly important kind of percept not described earlier is called a derived
percept, and operates on a character's already existing beliefs. Derived percepts are
able to evaluate objects based on the primitive features other percepts have extracted,
and can therefore make more complex assessments of objects, rather than just per-
forming simple feature extraction. For instance, a derived food percept could look at
the "shape" stored in the shape percept history of an object and see that it is "cheese
shape", and then look at the color stored in the color percept history and see that
it is "yellow", and match this object as a food object, based on previous knowledge
that yellow cheese-shaped objects are food.
Figure 5-5: An example action system. Purple rectangles represent tuples. Red circles
are trigger contexts, yellow triangles are objects, and blue rectangles are actions (do-
until contexts not shown). There are three motivational subsystems in this example
action system.
5.6 Action System
A character's action system is responsible for behavior arbitration - choosing what
behavior the character engages in and when it does so. Individual behaviors are
represented in our system as action tuples [21] and are organized into a hierarchical
structure composed of motivational subsystems (which are described below). An
example action system is shown in figure 5-5. Each action tuple contains one or more
actions to perform, trigger contexts in which to perform the action, an optional object
to perform the action on, and do-until contexts indicating when the action has been
completed.
The action is a piece of code primarily responsible for sending high-level requests
for movements or movement sequences to the motor system. The requests can range
from something relatively simple such as to "look at" an object, to more complex
actions like "reach for the cheese". Actions in tuples towards the top of the hierarchy
are more general (e.g. "satisfy hunger"), and become more specific farther down, with
leaves in the action tree corresponding to individual requests to the motor system
(e.g. "perform the eating movement"). Actions have associated values, which can
be inherent (i.e. pre-programmed) or learned, and represent the utility of performing
that action to the creature (for further discussion of action values see [21]).
Trigger contexts are responsible for deciding when the actions should be activated.
In general, there are a variety of internal (e.g., motivations) and external (e.g. percep-
tions) states that might trigger a particular action. For instance, both the presence
of food and the level of a character's hunger might be triggers for an "eat" action
(specific action triggers used in this thesis are discussed in more detail in section 6.2).
Similarly, a tuple's do-until contexts decide when the action has completed.
Many behaviors, such as eating and reaching, must be carried out in reference to
a particular object in the world. In our system, this object is known as the object
of attention, and is chosen by a belief selector installed in the action tuple. In this
thesis, all action tuples not at the top-level of the action hierarchy defer their choice
of object to the tuple at the top of their motivational subsystem. Action tuples at the
top of motivational hierarchies choose objects of attention most likely to satisfy the
particular drive they serve (e.g. a satisfy hunger tuple might choose a nearby food
object), and write these choices into working memory for the tuples below them to
use.
Action tuples are grouped into action groups that are responsible for deciding at
each moment which tuple will be executed. Each action group can have a unique
action selection scheme, and there can be only one tuple per action group active
at a time. All the action groups in this thesis use a probabilistic action selection
mechanism, that chooses among all the tuples they contain based on their respective
trigger and action values. As mentioned earlier, the characters in this thesis use
an action system that is hierarchically organized and motivationally driven. This
hierarchical organization means that each level of the action system has its own
action group, containing increasingly specific, mutually exclusive, action tuples. At
the top-level are tuples whose purpose is simply to satisfy a particular motivation or
drive, such as a play or hunger drive. Since these tuples are in the same action group,
only one of them may be active at a time, which keeps the character from dithering
between competing drives.
Below each of these motivational tuples, are tuples representing increasingly spe-
cific mechanisms for satisfying drives. For instance, below the satisfy hunger action
tuple (whose sub-hierarchy is shown in figure 5-6), are tuples such as get food, and eat
Figure 5-6: A simplified diagram of Max's hunger motivational subsystem (the top-
level of his play motivational subsystem is shown as well)
food, and below get food are in turn reach for food and jump for food. Again, at each
of these levels of the hierarchy, only one action tuple at a time may be active. For ex-
ample, satisfy hunger, get food and reach for food could all be simultaneously active,
but reach for food and jump for food cannot be active at the same time (which makes
intuitive sense, since they would require the character to perform conflicting motions
simultaneously). I will talk a bit more about drives and motivations in the following
section. Finally, one important point about the hierarchical action structure used by
the characters in this thesis is its striking similarity to the motivationally-driven hi-
erarchical behavior systems hypothesized by ethologists and cognitive scientists such
as Whiten [121], Bryne and Russon [351, and Timberlake [110] [109] (described in
section 2.1.1).
5.6.1 Motivations, Drives and Autonomic Variables
Burke [33] provides an excellent description of the use of autonomic variables within
the Synthetic Characters system:
Our atomic component of internal representation is the Autonomic
Variable. Autonomic Variables each produce a continuous scalar-valued
quantity. Most Autonomic Variables have drift points values that they
drift toward in the absence of any other input. Some of the creature's
Autonomic Variables represent Drives, like the hunger drive depicted in
the figure below. In addition to its drift point, each Drive also has a set
point, the value at which the drive is considered satisfied. The strength of
the drive is proportional to the magnitude of the difference between the
set point and the output value. Associated with each Drive is a scalar
drive multiplier that allows the creature to compare the importance of
various drives. Over the course of a creatures existence, these multipliers
might change, so that the creature can favor different drives at different
times. This mechanism can be used to create periodic changes in the
creatures drives (for example, to produce a circadian rhythm) and induce
drive-based developmental growth over a creatures lifespan.
0.0 (set point) 0.8 (drift point)
hunger
04 1.0
Figure 5-7: An autonomic variable, the atomic component of internal representation
(from Burke 2001 [33])
In this thesis, drive values are used as input to both action triggers and action
values, so that, for instance, the satisfy hunger tuple is triggered by a large rise in the
hunger drive, while the value of performing the satisfy hunger tuple is proportional to
the strength of the drive. For more information on autonomic variables and drives,
please see the rest of Burke's discussion in [33].
5.7 Motor System
Note: The motor system described in this section is based on the system originally developed by
Downie [47], and retains many of its predecessor's representations and mechanisms
For most character architectures, a creature consists broadly of two components-
a behavior system and a motor system. Where the behavior system is responsible for
working out what the creature ought to be doing, the motor system is responsible for
carrying out the behavior systems requests. The primary task of the motor system
for a conventional 3D virtual character is therefore to generate a coordinated series of
animations that take the character from where his body is now to where the behavior
system would like it to be. To do this, our motor system must possess a number of
basic competencies: given a set of source animations created by animators, the motor
system must be able to play out animations onto character bodies on command e.g.
a walk cycle; it must be able to layer animations e.g. a hand wave atop a walk cycle;
and it must be able to blend animations-e.g. blending turn left with walk forward
to produce an intermediately turning walk cycle.
However, these competencies alone aren't sufficient for accomplishing more so-
phisticated motor learning tasks such as imitation. For this, our motor system must
have additional capabilities, such as modeling body configurations, reflecting on its
own contents, coordinating animations with respect to goals (e.g. get my hand close
to the food; walk over to the toy and reach for it), and generating novel animations.
Additionally, the choice of motor representation becomes critically important if we
are interested in the kind of perception-production coupling suggested by Meltzoff's
research, research on mirror neurons and Simulation Theory. For this, we need a
movement representation that can be used not only to easily generate actions, but to
help recognize them. Therefore, because of the importance of motor representation
to the goals of this thesis, I will explore the motor system in a bit more detail than I
have spent on the systems described so far.
Figure 5-8: A simple posegraph. Green lines are allowable transitions between poses.
The Blue square is the pose representing the characters current body configuration.
5.7.1 The Posegraph
Our creatures use multi-resolution, directed, weighted graphs, known as posegraphs
as their motor representation (An example posegraph is shown in figure 5-8. For a
discussion of graph-based motor systems see [47], and also [3] and [73]).
To create a characters posegraph, source animation material is broken up into
Poses corresponding to key-frames from the animation, and into collections of con-
nected poses known as movements, which generally correspond to individual source
animations or motor actions, and are discussed in more detail in section 5.7.3. These
representations can be annotated and associated with pre-computed information. An-
imations can be generated or reformed in real-time by interpolating down a path of
connected pose nodes, with edges between nodes representing allowable transitions
between poses (or at a lower level of resolution, between movements). This creates
both flexibility in the resolution of the motor pieces to be interacted with, and a
reduction in the size of the atomic units the motor system operates on. The graph
represents the possible motion space of a character, and any motor action the char-
acter executes can be represented as a path through the posegraph.
5.7.2 Moving around the graph
The motor system takes the body from an arbitrary pose in the graph to a particular
desired pose by searching for the shortest path along the edges of the graph. We use
a popular graph search algorithm known as the A* search algorithm [72].The use of
the A* algorithm will generate search results on demand - rather than a statically
computed 'all pairs shortest path' algorithm. This allows us to change the distances
of edges and change content and topology at run-time without an expensive recom-
putation.
The motor system travels along the paths found by the A* search algorithm, and
generates animations by interpolating between the joint angles contained in the poses.
If two adjacent nodes originated from the same source animation we already know
the time difference between the nodes, because the information is stored in the pose.
Failing that, we can estimate the time it might take to interpolate between two frames
based on the current joint positions and velocities of the two nodes this calculation
is similar to those we perform to find the distance between two poses.
5.7.3 Multi-resolution graphs
As mentioned previously, we can build and store lower resolution views of the motor
graph-views of the graph whose nodes are made up of more than one pose. These
lower-resolution versions of the graph have a number of possible organizations, all of
which may be used within a given motor system. Of particular interest, are versions of
the graph where pose nodes are grouped into movements, each of which corresponds
to an animation (either a source animation or a procedurally generated one).
Movements generally correspond to things we might intuitively think of as com-
plete actions (e.g, sitting, jumping, waving), and therefore often match up closely with
requests from the behavior system. While the pose representation provides us with
greater motor knowledge and flexibility, the movement representation is often a more
natural unit to work with. Our motor system takes advantage of both representations
by being able to transition freely between the two views of the graph.
Movements provide the motor system with a shorthand for commonly executed
motor actions, allowing comparisons to be made, and information stored, for entire
paths through the posegraph. This shorthand speeds up the path discovery process;
movements may be used as destination nodes, in which case we need only find the
Figure 5-9: An example graph of movement nodes. Large rectangles represent move-
ments, small squares represent poses. Stacks represent blended movements and poses
movement node itself, and then interpolate through the poses it contains, rather
than searching each time for the shortest path from pose to pose. In general, lower
resolution graph views have far fewer nodes and edges, and can be searched quickly
to find areas of the high-resolution graph that may contain the pose that best solves
a particular problem. Finally, movements may themselves be grouped, allowing for
increasingly coarse views of the graph to be created.
Another multi-resolution aspect of the graph is seen in a representation called the
blended pose. A blended pose is a pose containing sub-poses that it blends together
at run-time, in order to derive its joint angle, velocity, timing and other data. We
can use this ability to blend between different gaits of walking, different degrees of
turning, or for looking in different directions, and to create a continuous output space
of poses.
5.7.4 Motor Programs
There is an important void in the framework described so far- we have no formal way
of specifying a complex, coordinated, task (e.g. sit down; turn-left, move forward,
move for-ward, stop), or to recognize that a particular task or gesture has been
achieved. In the simplest case, where the complex act corresponds to a previously
created movement, these things are free. To animate the complex act, the motor
system should simply interpolate through the poses in the corresponding movement;
the act is finished when the last pose in the movement has been played out.
We use motor programs, simple pieces of computation created by the motor sys-
tem, to specify and complete motor tasks. The simplest example program might
simply be:
GetPath from currentNode to sit;
Wait until currentNode == sit;
Which would tell the motor system to find a path from the node representing the
characters current body configuration to the movement node labeled sit, and then to
wait for that path to be interpolated and played out on the characters body, before
making another motor request. Alternatively:
GetPathTo sit start;
Wait until currentNode == sit start;
GetPathTo sit middle;
Wait until currentNode sit middle
would similarly generate a sit animation. Here, the labels sit start and sit middle
refer to labeled pose nodes from the original sit animation, rather than movement
nodes. Note that while the motor program itself waits for the path it is requesting to
complete, the motor system may ask to stop it at any point during its execution, and
start another program from the point it leaves off (motor programs in turn can voice
opinions as to whether or not they are able to stop). Motor programs responsible
for playing out particular motor actions can also let the behavior and motor systems
know when the actions have started or completed:
GetPathTo sit start;
Wait until currentNode == sit start;
Post sit begun
Additionally, the computations done by a motor program are not limited to finding
paths to predetermined nodes, but can be as far-ranging as searching for the pose that
best matches an example body configuration, finding the path that brings a body part
closest to a variable location (e.g. get your hands as close as possible to the cheese),
and conditionally choosing different destination nodes depending on behavior system
(or other) input.
Finally, labels within motor programs can also refer to other motor programs in
which case the program:
execute sit;
wait until sit finished;
execute follow your nose
would set a course for whatever node the program sit decides to go to, and wait
until the sit program ends, cycles or otherwise allows itself to be interrupted, before
starting the follow your nose program, which could itself have many sub-programs.
Therefore we build in the ability to have a stack of programs and sub-programs
active at any one time. Since these programs can generate destination nodes, and
even the contents of destination nodes dynamically, they allow us to generate paths
and movements that go beyond recreations of source animation material.
5.8 Summary
This chapter introduced the cognitive architecture used by characters such as Max
and Morris. The systems described here allow an animated character (or a robot) to
perceive and act upon the world around it, in a natural and life-like way. Further-
more, these systems were designed with the sensory, behavioral, and motor abilities of
humans and animals in mind. In particular, our characters use a hierarchical action
system much like that described in section 2.1.1, and our motor representation can be
used to implement mirror neuron-like perception-production coupling (we will return
to this idea at several points in this thesis). Next, we will explore the specifics behind
Max and Morris's behavior.
Chapter 6
Implementation and Results
Now that I have introduced Max and Morris, as well as described their underlying
cognitive architecture, it's time to look at the specifics of how the Simulation Theory-
style social learning system behind their behavior is implemented.
6.1 Imitation and Movement Recognition
6.1.1 Overview
As described in chapter 4, Max the Mouse is able to observe and imitate his friend
Morris's movements, by comparing them to the movements he knows how to perform
himself. Max watches Morris through a color-coded synthetic vision system, which
uses a graphical camera mounted in Max's head to render the world from Max's
perspective (described in section 5.3.1). The color-coding allows Max to visually
locate and recognize a number of key body parts (also referred to here as effectors)
on Morris's body, such as his hands, nose and feet. Currently, Max is hard-wired
to know the correspondence between his own effectors and Morris's (e.g. that his
right hand is like Morris's right hand), but previous projects have featured characters
using learned correspondences [28], and a similar extension is planned for this research
(discussed in section 7.2.1). Similarly, Max starts out knowing which body parts in
the image are which (e.g. that yellow is the color-code for the nose, and blue is for the
left hand), which is somewhat analogous to the idea that animals and infants have
innate templates for recognizing certain facial features [87].
When Max is asked to watch Morris, he roughly parses Morris's visible behavior
into individual movements and gestures. Max locates points in time when Morris was
momentarily still, or where he passed through a transitionary pose, such as standing,
both of which could signal the beginning or end of an action. Max then tries to
identify the observed movement, by comparing it to all the movement representations
contained within his own movement graph. To do this, Max compares the trajectories
of Morris's effectors to the trajectories his own limbs would take while performing a
given movement. This process allows Max to come up with the closest matching
motion in his repertoire, using as few as seven visible effectors (as of writing, I have
not tested the system using fewer than seven). By performing his best matching
movement or gesture, Max can imitate Morris. In the following sections, I describe
this process in more detail.
6.1.2 Parsing Observed Motion into Gestures
When Max uses his synthetic vision system to watch Morris, he sees an essentially
continuous stream of input, broken only into individual frames of graphics. Max
thus faces a classic motion capture problem: how to parse data from an ongoing
series of actions into individual movements and gestures, and how to recognize these
movements and gestures (the problem of recognizing and labeling object motion is
introduced by Badler in [6]). One common approach to segmenting motion data is
looking for large changes in the acceleration and velocity of key joints-which might
represent a body part changing directions or coming to a stop [50] [15]. Often, the
2nd derivative of the motion data is used to detect these points. This information is
then combined with a probabilistic model to try and identify whether these points
could be the beginnings or endings of movements.
In this case, I took a somewhat different approach to segmenting motion data.
Many different movements start and end in the same transitionary poses, such as
standing or sitting, so that these poses can potentially be used as segment markers.
Figure 6-1: An example graph of movement nodes. Large rectangles represent move-
ments, small squares represent poses. Stacks represent blended movements and poses
(this figure is the same as figure 5-9)
In fact the idea that certain poses or animations represent "hubs" in a character's
movement repertoire has previously been used in assembling motor graphs for an-
imated characters, and even for parsing human motion capture data [56]. As the
example movement graph in figure 6-1 shows, our characters' movement repertoires
generally follow just this sort of hub and spoke model. Here, I have taken advantage
of the fact that almost all of Max and Morris's movement primitives-that is, all the
animator-provided source animations that have been assembled into their pose and
movement graphs (as described in section 5.7)- pass through a standing position.
Rather than finding the 2nd derivative of the motion data for each effector, I use
the simpler approach of using places where Morris passes through a hub (in this case
standing), as potential indicators of the beginnings and endings of movements.
Looking for Movement Hubs-An Example
Let's say that Max watches Morris first jump up in the air, and then cover his face
with his hands. How does he take this continuous image sequence and correctly
divide it into two gestures (rather than one or four or ten)? As described in section
Node
Figure 6-2: Morris viewed from Max's perspective. The colored sphere marking his
root node is circled in yellow.
5.3.1, when Max watches Morris, his synthetic vision sensor extracts the world-space
position of each of Morris's visible body parts (the use of body part positions and
the choice of which parts to use is discussed in the following section). The most
important of these positions is Morris's root node (see figure 6-2), which Max uses
as a reference point for Morris's movements-converting the world-space position of
Morris's other body parts to root node relative positions (e.g. where Morris's hands,
elbows and feet are relative to the center of his body, rather than to the center of
the world). In order to do this, Max must figure out which way Morris is facing.
For this, he uses another visible body part-Morris's nose, as a forward reference.
Max assumes that Morris's nose is always in front of the center of Morris's body, and
uses the vector between the two points as Morris's forward vector. These pieces of
information-the world-space position of Morris's root node and the direction he is
facing- are sufficient for a standard coordinate frame transformation.
Max also has another important source of information-himself. By looking at
his own stand movement, Max can find where his body parts are positioned relative
to his root node while he is standing, forming an example standing pose. Max can
then compare this example pose with each incoming frame of motion data, to see how
close Morris's current position is to standing. The distance metric used to do this
comparison is extremely simple:
dist(A, B) = Z= 1d(AiBi) (6.1)N
Where N is the number of of visible body parts, A is Max's sample standing pose,
B is the observed pose, and Ai and Bi are the x, y, z coordinates of body part i within
those poses. The distance between Ai and Bi is given by d, defined as:
d(a, b) = ,(ai - bi) 2 + (a2 - b2 )2 + (a3 - b3 )2  (6.2)
where a and b are 3-dimensional vectors. In other words, the distance between stand-
ing and an incoming pose is the average distance between the body parts in both
poses. For each pose, only the currently visible body parts are used in the compari-
son (i.e. if the hands are currently obscured, they are left out of the distance metric),
which is why an average is used.
Going back to our example, this means that as Morris begins to jump, the distance
between his current position and standing increases. At a certain point, an empirically
determined threshold is reached, indicating that he is no longer standing (see figure 6-
3). Conversely, as Morris falls back to the ground, and starts returning to a standing
position, the distance between his current pose and standing drops, until it is once
again below threshold. As Morris raises his arms to cover his eyes, the distance of
his current pose from standing begins to increase again, and the threshold distance
is crossed once more.
In other words, simply by keeping track of when the threshold between standing
and not-standing is crossed, and whether it was crossed on a rising or falling edge,
Max can find the beginnings and endings of Morris's movements. Added accuracy can
be obtained by low-pass filtering the distance values, but as we will see in the next
section, only a roughly accurate parsing of the motion data into individual movement
segments is necessary in order for Max to correctly identify the movements he sees
Morris performing. A nice aspect of this approach is that Max can use his body-
knowledge-the knowledge that his movements tend to start and end in hubs, and
2 3 4
Figure 6-3: This figure shows 4 frames of Morris moving into a jump. In frame 1
Morris starts in a standing position. by frame 3 his body position has changed enough
to cross the threshold between standing and moving.
the knowledge of what his own hubs (standing) look like-to simplify the motion
parsing problem.
Other Approaches to Movement Parsing
While the "hub-and-spoke" approach to movement parsing presented here turned
out to be sufficient for our purposes, we have also implemented some supplementary
movement parsing mechanisms. These additional mechanisms can provide help at
points of ambiguity, where it is unclear if a transition has occurred or not, and could
potentially be used to parse more challenging data sources, such as human motion
capture data.
The first such mechanism is a system that models the demonstrator's movements
over time, and identifies points of return (i.e. particular positions or poses within the
motion that the demonstrator keeps returning to). These locations often represent
significant breaking points in the motion, particularly in cyclical movements such as
reaching, walking, jumping etc.
Additionally, we have implemented a mechanism that keeps track of when key
effectors (e.g. the hands and feet), come close to, or draw away from, objects in the
environment, which again, might indicate the beginning or ending of a movement (for
further discussion of the limits and extensibility of our movement parsing approach,
see section 7.2.2).
Using Visible Body Part Locations
Frequently in movement recognition research, input data is received in the form of
joint angles gathered from motion capture suits. I chose to use the positions of key
body parts rather than joint angles as my input for reasons of biological plausibility.
First, while joint angle data is easily available from motion capture suits (and cur-
rently, is often the only way to gather human data) and potentially from synthetic
environments, it is much more difficult to calculate from visual information alone.
It seems unlikely that humans and other animals are making extensive joint angle
inferences during their observations of others, and similarly, calculating joint angle
positions from synthetic visual data is much more difficult than simply finding body
part positions. Furthermore, research has shown that people who are watching others
move spend most of their time attending to the locations of certain key body parts,
like hands and elbows [50]. I attempted to choose equivalently salient body parts-
the hands, elbows, knees, feet, torso (root node), and nose. Additionally, effector
positions turn out to be a very flexible form of input. The system has been success-
fully run using only the hands, feet, torso, nose and neck, and, as described below,
compensates well for partial or obscured data.
6.1.3 Matching Observed Gestures to Movements in the Graph
Once Max has seen Morris perform a complete action, he is faced with another classic
problem: movement recognition. Max must classify the movement he has seen as one
of a set of movements (in this case the set comprised of the movements he is able to
perform himself). There have been many computational approaches to the problem
of gesture and movement recognition from visual data (see for example [125], [16],
[23] and reviews in [54] and [127]), most of which use a set of probabilistic models
to classify gestures, and rely on a large pre-existing example set. Here, rather than
providing Max with a large set of example movements, we note that he already has a
built-in example set-his own movement repertoire, represented by his posegraph.
As Max watches Morris demonstrate a gesture, he represents each frame of ob-
served motion by noting the world-space positions of Morris's body parts relative to
the center of Morris's body. He then searches his posegraph for the poses (frames)
closest to the beginning of the observed action (e.g. poses with similar hand, nose,
and foot positions to those he's seen). Max uses these best-matching poses as start-
ing places for searching his posegraph, exploring outward along the edges from these
nodes, and discarding paths whose distance from the demonstrated gesture has be-
come too high. Max can then look at the path generated through his graph and
see whether it corresponds closely to any of his existing movements, or whether it
represents a novel gesture. In the next section, I will describe movement matching in
a bit more detail.
Matching Observed Movements-An Example
Let's go back to the example of Max watching Morris jump in the air and then cover
his face with his hands. How does Max identify these gestures with his own cover
face and jump movements?
To briefly review from section 5.7, Max's motor representation consists of a multi-
resolution graph. At the lowest resolution, nodes in the graph represent individual
frames of animation, while at a higher level, nodes represent motion primitives (com-
plete animations) called movements, which are collections of connected poses, forming
a path through the graph. Edges in the graph represent allowable transitions between
nodes, and animations are formed by interpolating along paths in the posegraph.
When Max sees Morris jump, he represents jumping as a sort of path as well-as a
sequential series of poses containing the root-relative positions of Morris's body parts.
So, in order to represent Morris's jump in his own motion space, Max needs to find
the path through his posegraph that is 'closest' to the path he observed. Max chooses
a frame from the middle of the observed jump as a starting point for identifying what
he's seen. The middle of a movement tends to be more representative (i.e. less generic
or similar to other movements) than the beginning or the end. He then searches all
the poses in his graph for those most similar to this representative frame, using the
distance metric defined in equation 6.1.2. Max next searches outward from each of
these best-matching poses, trying to assemble the overall best-matching path, and
pruning his search as he goes along.
The following set of figures walks through a very simple example of the matching
process. In this first figure, the bright green circle in the observed movement is the
first pose to be matched, and the bright green circles in the posegraph are the two
best matches:
Posegraph
Observed Movement
Figure 6-4: The movement matching process-step 1
Now the next frame in the observed movement is compared to the children of the
initial matches (the children are shown in blue): This gives us four potential paths
Posegraph
Observed Movement
Figure 6-5: the movement matching process-step 2
(since there are four potential next poses). Only the best-matching of these paths
will be kept, where the distance between the observed movement 0 and a given path
P is defined as:
pathDistance = dist(Oi, P )
i=1
(6.3)
Where N is the length of the path currently being considered (in this case, two poses
long).
Let's say that, in this example, we keep only the two best paths each time:
Figure 6-6:
1A N' Posegraph
Observed Movement
The movement matching process-step 3
Next, we work in the other direction, looking at the parents of each potential path
(shown in red):
Posegraph
Observed Movement
Figure 6-7: The movement matching process-step 4
rM
Again, we keep only the two best-matching paths:
Posegmph
Obswved Movement
Figure 6-8: The movement matching process-step 5
The process is repeated for the remaining poses in the observed movement:
Obwwd Movement
Figure 6-9: The movement matching process-step 6
Posegraph
Observed Movement
Figure 6-10: The movement matching process-step 7
Posegraph
Observed Movement
Figure 6-11: The movement matching process-step 8
Posegraph
Observed Movement
Figure 6-12: The movement matching process-step 9
Finally, we choose the best-matching of the two remaining paths:
Posegraph
Observed Movement
Figure 6-13: The movement matching process-step 10
Max then takes this best-matching path and checks to see which movements the
poses in the path are part of. If the majority are from a particular movement (in this
case, jumping), Max assumes that this is the movement he saw Morris performing.
Distinguishing Similar Movements
Often, characters must differentiate between two very similar looking movements (or
combinations of movements). Max and Morris have a number of distinct gestures
that use the same body parts and produce similar motion trajectories, such as wav-
ing vs. knocking vs giving a thumbs up, reaching high up vs jumping, jumping to
reach something vs jumping for joy, and quite a few others. While we have not set
out to explicitly test the limits of our system's ability to distinguish between sim-
ilar movement primitives, the experience in implementing this thesis has been that
movements that are similar, but visibly different to human observers, produce enough
subtle variation in the body position, trajectory, or speed of a movement to be suc-
cessfully distinguished by our system (whether this would remain true with noisier
vision data is harder to say-see section 7.2.2 for a discussion).
Characters With Differing Posegraphs
Until now, we have also only been discussing characters who share the same move-
ment space (i.e. they have identical posegraphs). What happens to the movement
recognition process if Max and Morris don't have the same movement primitives?
We created versions of Max and Morris with somewhat different posegraphs, where
a subset of each character's movements were similar, but not identical, to a corre-
sponding set of the other character's movements. Again, while we did not explicitly
test the limits of the system, our observation is that, in these situations, Max picked
what appeared to be the closest approximation of the gestures he saw Morris per-
forming.
For example, Max had a movement in his motor system that involved covering his
face with his hands. Meanwhile Morris had a similar movement, where he covered
his face and shook his head, rocking back and forth. Morris's movement took longer
than Max's to perform, and involved the motion of a number of additional body
parts. Nevertheless, Max identified his own, non-identical, cover face movement as
the closest match in his system.
There is a relatively graceful degradation to the matching process between non-
identical graphs. As the movement primitives the two characters possess become
more disparate, the closest match becomes coarser (e.g. when Max has no cover face
equivalent at all, the best match to seeing Morris cover his face is to reach up with his
arms near his head). Ultimately, the character might decide that what he is seeing
doesn't match any of his existing movements at all, and is instead a completely novel
movement (see section 6.1.3).
Blended Movements
Another way in which differences in movement repertoire are dealt with in this imple-
mentation is through the use of blended movements (described in section 5.7.3). For
example, Max's reach movement is a blended movement, composed of nine separate
reaching animations, which, when blended together, allow him to reach all around his
body. By comparing Morris's movements to each of the sub-movements in reach, Max
can see if the movement he observed is contained within the space the sub-movements
define, even if it doesn't correspond directly to any of them.
Identifying Novel Movements
In the case where Max and Morris have posegraphs containing different movements,
Morris could perform a movement that doesn't closely match any of the movements
in Max's repertoire. Max decides that a movement he has observed is novel when
the best-matching path through his graph doesn't closely correspond to any of his
existing movements (i.e. the poses in the path are contained within many different
movements, or aren't traversed in the order any existing movements traverse them).
The use of novel movements is discussed briefly in the next section, and in more detail
in section 7.2.6.
Advantages of Graph-based matching
One important benefit of using the posegraph to classify observed motion is that it
simplifies the problem of dealing with partially observed (or poorly parsed) input. If
Max watches Morris jump, but doesnt see the first part of the motion, he will still
be able to classify the movement as jumping because the majority of the matching
path in his posegraph will be contained within his own jump movement. Conversely,
if Max has observed a bit of what Morris was doing before and after jumping, as well
as the jump itself, he can use the fact that the entire jump movement was contained
within the matching path in his graph to infer that this is the important portion of
the observed motion. In general, this graph-based matching process allows observed
behaviors to be classified amongst a characters own actions in real-time without
needing any previous examples.
Additionally, while this functionality has not yet been taken advantage of, a graph-
based matching system makes it easy for a character to learn completely novel move-
ment primitives through observation. If the matching path in the graph does not
correspond to any existing movements it can be grouped into a new movement, since
Figure 6-14: Morris covering his eyes, as seen by Max. Notice that some of the spheres
marking his body parts are not visible. This is a repeat of figure 4-9.
a movement is just a path through the posegraph.
Finally, another important note is that the combination of using effector locations
as input, and using a graph-based matching process, appears to compensate well for
the natural obstructions of visibility and changes in viewpoint that occur when one
creature is observing another. For example, Max is able to correctly identify and
imitate Morris's cover face movement, even though his nose and hands are not visible
at several points during the movement (see figure 4-9).
6.1.4 Imitation
Once Max has seen Morris jump in the air, and identified this movement as jumping,
Max's action system can request a jump movement from his motor system, allowing
him to imitate Morris. One important aspect of this implementation of imitation is
that it uses a Simulation Theory-style approach in order to give one character knowl-
edge of what the other has done. In particular, not only is Max's own motor represen-
tation used to classify Morris's movements, this classification is done explicitly-that
is, Max doesn't just play out the animation generated by the matching path in his
posegraph, he performs the movement this path most likely represents. This means
that when Max sees Morris jump, he can not only imitate that jump, but identify it
with his own jumping, and begin to look at what jumping is often used for. Coupling
the perception (classification) and production of movements allows Max to begin ex-
Figure 6-15: An example action system. Purple rectangles represent tuples. Red
circles are trigger contexts, yellow triangles are objects, and blue rectangles are actions
(do-until contexts not shown). This figure is a repeat of figure 5-5.
amining the motivations and goals for these movements, an idea I will explore in the
next few sections.
6.2 Identifying Actions, Motivations and Goals
We just saw that, by matching observed gestures and movements to his own, Max is
able to imitate Morris. Max can also use this same ability to try and identify which
actions he believes Morris is currently performing.
As described in section 5.6, Max and Morris both choose their actions using mo-
tivationally driven, hierarchically organized action systems, composed of individual
action units known as action tuples (detailed in [21]). Each action tuple contains
one or more actions to perform, trigger contexts in which to perform the action, an
optional object to perform the action on, and do-until contexts indicating when the
action has been completed. Within each level of the action hierarchy, tuples com-
pete probabilistically for expression, based on their action and trigger values. Action
tuples towards the top of the hierarchy are more general (e.g. satisfy hunger), and
become more specific farther down, with leaves in the action tree corresponding to
individual requests to the motor system (e.g. perform the eating movement).
Max keeps a record of movement-action correspondences, that is, which action he
is generally trying to carry out when he performs a particular movement (e.g. the
reaching gesture is most often performed during the getting action). When he sees
Morris perform a given movement, he identifies the action tuples it is most likely to be
a part of. He then evaluates a subset of the trigger contexts, known as can-I triggers,
to determine which of these actions was possible under the current circumstances. In
this way, Max uses his own action selection and movement generation mechanisms
to identify the action that Morris is currently performing. The following sections
describe this process in greater depth.
6.2.1 Action Identification: Example 1
Let's say that Max sees Morris eating a piece of cheese. How does Max identify that
action as eating, and how does he know that it is part of the hunger motivational
subsystem (shown in figure 6-16)?
Figure 6-16: A simplified diagram of Max's hunger motivational subsystem (the top-
level of his play motivational subsystem is shown as well). This figure is the same as
figure 6-16 seen earlier.
When Max sees Morris eat, the first thing he does is identify the movement he
sees Morris performing (as described in section 6.1.3). In this case that movement
is eating. Next, Max searches his map of movement-action correspondences to find
out which of the action tuples in his action hierarchy have requested this movement
in the past. Recall that a movement is an individual motion primitive, such as
reaching, jumping or eating, while an action is a behavior that occurs in a motivational
and environmental context, and requests that the motor system carry out particular
movements. In this case, Max finds that he has only performed the eating movement
during his eat action (figure 6-17).
Figure 6-17: Identifying where the eat movement is used
Max then traces back up his action hierarchy from the eating action tuple. In the
simple example shown in figure 6-18, the eating tuple is a direct child of the satisfy
hunger tuple, which represents the top level of the hunger motivational subsystem.
By tracing back up his action hierarchy, Max has discovered that he only performs
the eating movement when his eat action tuple is active, and he only uses his eat
action tuple when he's trying to satisfy his hunger. Therefore, Max now knows that
it's likely that Morris was eating, and that he was eating because he was hungry. Now,
Max must verify that it was possible for Morris to be eating, given the environmental
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Figure 6-18: the path through Max's action system to his eating action
circumstances. To do this, Max once again uses a simulation theoretic approach-he
checks whether it would have been possible for him to eat if he were in Morris's place.
Max evaluates the can-I triggers at each level of his action hierarchy, on the way
to the eat action tuple. In this case, there are only two levels, with one can-I trigger
each (figure 6-19). At the top-level, the can-I trigger food object present simply checks
whether there are any food objects in the environment. This kind of trigger is known
as an object selection trigger, since it checks whether any appropriate objects are
available, and then selects one of them as the object of attention for all the actions
below it in the hierarchy. The simplest object selection trigger simply searches the
belief system for beliefs about objects that have certain perceptual features. To review
from section 5.5, the belief system stores a character's representation of perceptual
input in the form of beliefs, which generally correspond to individual objects in the
world, and contain percept histories of what the object's features have been over a
short time period (e.g. the object's shape, color, location etc.). In this case, Max has
a derived percept that recognizes food items, and so the food object present trigger
looks for beliefs about objects that the food percept has fired on (i.e. objects that have
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Figure 6-19: Evaluating the can-I triggers along the path to Max's eating action
been marked as food). For more information on the belief and perception systems
please see chapter 5.
One subtle but important point here is that Max must check whether there was
any food at the time he saw Morris eating, not whether there is any food available
currently, which is what he would check if he himself were hungry. Luckily, since the
belief system stores percept histories for each belief, Max's food object present trigger
can simply search for food objects at the time Morris began eating, rather than at the
current time. In this case, the food object present trigger finds that a piece of cheese
was available, and sets the belief about this piece of cheese as the object of attention.
Now there is only one more can-I trigger to check. Max's eat action tuple can
only be activated if he is currently holding a piece of food (see figure 6-19). Max's
holding food trigger is a proximity trigger, which checks if two objects are within a
certain distance of each other. Normally, the holding food trigger checks whether the
object of attention is in the same place as one of Max's hands. However, because he
is currently simulating Morris's situation, in this case the holding food trigger must
instead check if the object of attention was in the same place as one of Morris's
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hands. Since Morris's hands are both visible body parts, their positions when he
started eating are stored in Max's belief about Morris. In other words, Max can
simply evaluate his holding food trigger using his belief about Morris instead of his
belief about himself (representations of self and other are described in more detail in
section 6.2.4). Here, he finds that Morris was in fact holding a piece of cheese at the
beginning of the eating movement. The holding food trigger returns true, and Max
concludes that Morris was indeed eating because he was hungry, and demonstrates
this by miming eating.
In general, evaluating Max's can-I triggers from Morris's perspective is almost
identical to evaluating them from Max's perspective, with just two important changes:
o Evaluation occurs for the timestep in which the observed action began, not for
the current timestep
o Max's belief about Morris is used everywhere he would normally use his belief
about himself
In the following section, I will go through an example where Max uses this technique
to identify a more ambiguous action.
6.2.2 Action Identification: Example 2
Let's say that Max sees Morris reaching for a piece of cheese instead of eating one.
Once again, how does he identify what Morris is doing?
As before, Max first identifies the movement he saw Morris performing, in this case
reaching. When Max looks in his action-movement correspondence map, he finds that
the reaching movement is used by his reach action-tuple. By tracing up his action
hierarchy from the reach tuple, Max finds that reach is part of the get tuple, which is
used by a number of motivational subsystems. In the example shown in figure 6-20,
get is used by both the hunger and play motivational subsystems.
Since Max uses the reach action tuple in a number of contexts, he must decide
which one of these contexts best matches Morris's current situation, in order to decide
what Morris is reaching for, and why he is reaching for it.
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Figure 6-20: The paths through Max's action hierarchy to the reach action. Notice
that it can be activated in both the hunger and play motivational subsystems
Max's movement-action correspondence map includes not only bottom-level action
tuples such as eat and reach, but also top-level ones such as satisfy hunger and play.
That is, when Max reaches while his satisfy hunger tuple is active, he remembers
that he performed the reaching movement during the reach, get, and satisfy hunger
tuples (see figure 6-21). In fact, the movement-action correspondence map is simply a
list of the actions that have been active when a particular movement was performed,
and the number of times that action was active for that movement. Therefore, Max
knows which motivation he is most often trying to satisfy while reaching-whichever
top-level tuple has the highest count for the reach action.
Let's say that in this case, Max has performed the reach action in order to play
more often than he has used it to satisfy hunger. He will start out by guessing that
Morris was reaching in order to play, since this is usually why he himself reaches, and
will then evaluate his can-I triggers along the path from play to reach to see if he's
correct (figure 6-22).
The first can-I trigger in the play motivational subsystem toy object present is
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Figure 6-21: When Max reaches for a piece of cheese in order to satisfy his hunger, the
satisfy hunger, get and reach action tuples are marked as having been active during
the reaching movement in Max's movement-action correspondence map
essentially identical to the food object present trigger discussed in the previous section,
except that it checks for objects labeled as toys rather than those labeled as food.
If there weren't any toys available, Max's evaluation of this path through the action
hierarchy will stop right here--he'll know that Morris couldn't have been reaching for
something to play with, because there were no toys to reach for.
Let's say that, when Max saw Morris reach, there was a ball available, as well
as a piece of cheese, but that the ball was high up in the air. In that case, the toy
object present trigger will return true, and Max will continue evaluating this path
through his action hierarchy. The next can-I trigger is a proximity trigger for the get
action, which checks whether the object of attention-in this case the ball-is close
enough to 'get' (but not so close that the character is already holding it). If the ball is
close enough to Morris that he could have gotten it by reaching or jumping (without
needing to walk anywhere), then this trigger will also return true.
Now, there is only one can-I trigger remaining-the object reachable trigger for
the reach tuple. Since the ball is high in the air, where Morris would have needed to
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kFigure 6-22: Max evaluates the can-I triggers along the path from the play tuple to
the reach tuple
jump in order to get it, the trigger will return false. This means that Morris is not
reaching in order to play, and so Max goes back to evaluate the other option, which
was reaching in order to eat (shown in figure 6-23).
Here, all the can-I triggers come out true-there is a food object (cheese) present,
it was 'gettable', and it was within reach. Max concludes that even though he reaches
for toys more frequently than for food, under the circumstances, Morris was most
likely reaching for the cheese.
If the ball and the cheese had been close together, where they were both reachable,
Max would have mistakenly guessed that Morris was reaching for the ball rather than
for the cheese. However, this is a 'natural' mistake-one person observing another
reach towards a number of objects would have difficulty deciding which one was the
desired object without additional information.
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Figure 6-23: Max evaluates the can-I triggers along the path from the statisfy hunger
tuple to the reach tuple
Distinguishing Actions that Share Movements
In many cases, different actions (i.e. actions that have different trigger or do-until
contexts, or operate on different objects) utilize the same movement. In the previous
example, reachng for the cheese and reaching for the ball could be considered different
actions, because they are directed at different objects. Max can't tell which of these
Morris is performing just by identifying the reach movement-he needs to evaluate
the tuple and find Morris's object of attention to discover whether he's reaching for
the cheese or the ball. Our flexible belief selector mechanism (described in section
5.5.1 allows the same action tuple to operate on multiple objects, so that the reach
for cheese and reach for ball actions can be represented by the same tuple. However,
if desired, they could also be represented as different tuples.
For example, a character might use the same movement for yo-yoing and for
dribbling a ball. In this case, the character might have a yo-yo the yo-yo action and
a dribble the ball action, which happen to perform the same movement on different
objects. This might be particularly desirable if the two actions also have different
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do-until contexts (e.g. yo-yo until you can 'sleep' the yo-yo vs dribble until done
playing). Just as in the case of actions that share a tuple, the system can correctly
distinguish between actions that share a movement and are represented in separate
tuples. If one of our characters saw the other perform a yo-yo/dribble movement,
he would identify all of his tuples that use that movement, and evaluate the can-I
triggers in their hierarchies. Since these two behaviors are performed in different
contexts, (one requiring the other character to be holding a yo-yo, the other a ball)
the character could correctly identify which one it had observed.
6.2.3 Step-By-Step Summary of Action Identification
Action identification is an integral, and potentially confusing, part of this thesis.
Here, I will provide a step-by-step summary of how Max is able to identify Morris's
actions.
Movement recognition. The very first thing Max must do is identify the movement
he saw Morris performing, classifying it as one of his own movements.
Finding actions that use the matching movement. Once Max has identified the
movement he saw Morris perform, he checks his movement-action map for all
the leaf nodes in his action system that use that movement.
Paths through the action hierarchy. Next, Max finds all the paths through his
action hierarchy which lead to these leaf action tuples. In other words, he
identifies all the higher-level actions that invoke the potentially matching lower-
level ones. He also identifies all the motivations that might lead to these actions,
since they're at the top of any path through the action hierarchy.
Evaluating the paths. Max needs to determine which of these actions (if any) it
would be possible for Morris to be performing. He does this by evaluating the
can-I triggers of the tuples all the way down the paths to the matching leaf
actions.
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Taking Morris's perspective In order to correctly evaluate the can-I triggers,
Max must evaluate them from Morris's perspective. Normally, these triggers
operate on Max's belief about himself-where his body parts are, where objects
are relative to him-here, he must use his belief about Morris instead.
Identifying the correct path. Max eliminates any paths that aren't possible, and
any leaf action-tuples that have no possible paths leading to them. When he is
left with one path to one possible lowest-level action, Max concludes that this
is the behavior Morris was performing.
6.2.4 Representing Self and Other
As alluded to in the previous sections, a critical part of identifying another's actions
is being able to use their point of view instead of one's own-and being able to easily
distinguish between the two. One of the most important beliefs in Max's belief system
is his belief about himself. Max's self-belief contains all his proprioceptive knowledge
(i.e. where he and his body parts are in space). All of the triggers and do-untils in
Max's system which rely on self-knowledge (e.g. triggers that rely on proximity to an
object, do-untils that succeed when holding an object) operate on Max's self-belief.
Similarly, Max has a belief about Morris which contains information about where
Morris currently is, where his body parts are, which way he is facing etc. Importantly,
Max filters his sensory information about himself and his sensory information about
Morris through the same percepts. This means that the information in the two beliefs
is stored in the same kinds of percept histories, and in the same format. Having the
two beliefs in the same format allows Max to easily evaluate all the triggers and do-
untils in his system that rely on self-knowledge from Morris's perspective, simply by
having them operate on his belief about Morris instead.
Max's action system has a belief selector for his self-belief and another for his
reference character belief-the character he is acting in reference to, or interacting
with (like the object of attention this belief is optional, so that not all actions need to
be in reference to another character). The reference character belief is used whenever
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Max needs to interact with or attend to Morris. Max can take Morris's perspective
by swapping the beliefs returned by the selectors, before evaluating actions. This
allows Max to evaluate actions "as if" he were Morris, while the independent beliefs
and belief selectors guarantee that his knowledge of Morris and of himself remain
separate.
6.2.5 Motivations and Goals
In the previous sections we focused on can-I triggers for action tuples-triggers that
represent whether a particular action is possible under the current circumstances.
Another subset of trigger contexts, known as should-I triggers, can be viewed as
simple motivations-for example, a should-I trigger for Max's eating action is hunger.
Similarly, some do-until contexts, known as success contexts, can represent low-level
goals-Max's success context for reaching for an object is holding the object in his
hands. By searching his own action system for the action that Morris is most likely
to be performing, Max can identify likely should-I triggers and success do-untils for
Morris's current actions. For example, if Max sees Morris eat, he can match this
with his own eating action, which is triggered by hunger, and know that Morris is
probably hungry. Similarly, Max can see Morris reaching for, or jumping to get, an
object, and know that Morris's goal is to hold the object in his hands, since that is
the success context for Max's own get action. Notice that in this second case, Max
does not need to discern the purpose of jumping and reaching separately, since these
are both subactions of get in his own hierarchy.
We are currently developing mechanisms that allow Max to use the trigger and
do-until information from his best matching action in order to interact with Morris
in a more socially intelligent way-for instance, Max might see Morris reaching and
help him get the object he is reaching for, bringing him closer to more advanced social
behavior such working on cooperative tasks (this future work is discussed further in
section 7.2.4).
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6.2.6 Learning About Objects
One important way in which Max can already learn by observing Morris is through
a process similar to that of social referencing, described in section 2.1. By watching
Morris interact with unknown objects, Max can learn some of the affordances of these
objects. Let's say Max starts out knowing that cheese is edible, but not knowing
anything about ice cream. Meanwhile, Morris knows that ice cream is an edible (and
tasty) treat. If Max watches Morris reach for the ice cream and is asked to identify
what Morris is doing he will shrug, indicating that he doesn't know why Morris is
reaching. This is because none of the possible paths to the reach tuple in Max's
action system seem valid (see figure 6-20)-there are no toy or food objects that Max
knows about within Morris's reach, and Max doesn't know what the object within
reach is for.
If however, Max sees Morris eat the ice cream cone, the story is different. When
Max sees Morris eat the ice cream cone, he tries to identify the action as usual-first
he identifies the movement he saw Morris perform as eating, next he identifies the
bottom-level action tuples eating is a part of, finds the eat tuple, and traces back up
the hierarchy from the eat tuple to the satisfy hunger tuple. Finally, he evaluates the
can-I triggers along the path between satisfy hunger and eat, and finds that they are
not satisfied-there is no food object to eat.
At this point, Max notices something important-the eat action tuple (and in turn
the eating movement) is only ever used to satisfy one drive, because it is only part
of one motivational subsystem (Max can determine this by looking at the number
of top-level tuples he has traced back to). Since eating to satisfy hunger is the only
purpose Max knows of for the eating movement, he checks to see if Morris could have
been eating an unknown object. To do this, he re-evaluates his can-I triggers with
a slight modification. He replaces the first can-I trigger-food object present with
another trigger, one that selects the object Morris is most likely to be interacting
with. The simplest version of such a trigger just picks the object that was closest to
Morris, though versions that take gaze direction into account have also been used.
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Once this object has been selected, Max checks to see whether the remaining can-
I triggers have become true. In this example, Max would choose the ice cream as
Morris's likely object of attention, and would find that Morris was in fact holding the
ice cream, making it possible for him to be eating it. Max would conclude that Morris
was eating the ice cream, and would add the ice cream shape to his food percept's list
of edible shapes. From this point on, Max would recognize ice cream as a potential
food source.
Max can learn about unknown toys in a similar manner. Here, there is a bit of a
twist, because toys can be played with in two different ways-by dancing or throwing
(the play motivational subsystem of the action hierarchy is shown in figure 6-24).
This means that when Max sees Morris dancing with a new toy he must learn both
Figure 6-24: The play motivational subsystem of the action hierarchy. Notice that
the dance and throw tuples have more than one can-I trigger-a proximity trigger
(holding object) which checks whether the object of attention is in Max's hands, and
an object selection trigger (Danceable object and Throwable object), which checks
whether the object of attention is of the appropriate type for that tuple to act on.
that it is a toy and that it is 'danceable'. Max does this by checking all the object
selection triggers in the matching path through the action hierarchy. Each object
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selection trigger checks for objects marked by a particular percept, and Max adds the
unfamiliar object's shape to each of these percepts. So, in the case of seeing Morris
dance with a hoop, Max would add the hoop shape to both the toy object and dance
object percepts, which are connected to the toy object present and danceable object
present triggers respectively.
6.3 Results
In this section, I would like to provide a brief summary of Max's social learning
capabilities, and present some additional figures demonstrating these abilities.
What Max Can Do
" Max is able to observe Morris using synthetic vision, and parse the continuous
stream of motion he observes Morris performing into individual movements.
" Max can use his own movement representation to identify the observed move-
ment. In other words, he classifies the observed movement as one of his own-a
form of perception-production coupling.
* Similarly, Max can use his own action system to identify the action he thinks
Morris has just performed. This identification occurs across the full range of
granularity in Max's action hierarchy.
" Identifying the action he believes Morris performed allows Max to also identify
the motivations and goals of that action, represented as should-I triggers and
success do-untils.
" Max can learn about the affordances of objects such as food and toys by watch-
ing Morris interact with these objects.
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What Max Can't Currently Do
" Max does not learn the correspondence between his body and Morris's-this
knowledge is built into the system.
* As mentioned in the introduction, Max cannot currently identify the movements
of characters with a different morphology than himself, and thus cannot identify
their actions and motivations.
" While Max is capable of using an approach similar to the one described in this
thesis to identify emotions, this extension is not yet fully implemented.
" Currently, while Max can identify Morris's goals, he does not act on this knowl-
edge.
" At the moment, Max simply ignores movements and actions he does not recog-
nize. Once again, functionality for learning these actions rather than ignoring
them already exists in the system, but it is not currently being utilized.
The following chapter presents future work meant to address a number of these issues,
as well as further discussing the results and implications of this thesis.
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Figure 6-25: Top row: Morris demonstrates jumping. Bottom row: Max imitates
jumping.
Figure 6-26: Top row: Morris demonstrates pounding the ground. Bottom row: Max
imitates pounding the gruond.
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Figure 6-27: Top row: Morris demonstrates giving a thumbs up. Bottom row: Max
imitates giving a thumbs up.
Figure 6-28: Left: Morris reaches for the piece of cheese. Right: Max identifies
Morris's action as reaching for the cheese.
Figure 6-29: Left:
action as eating.
Morris eats the piece of cheese. Right: Max identifies Morris's
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Chapter 7
Discussion and Future Work
At this point, we have seen that Max the Mouse (and by extension, other animated
characters and robots developed using the Synthetic Characters architecture), is ca-
pable of imitating other characters, identifying simple motivations and goals for their
behavior, and learning from their actions. Furthermore, the implementation of these
abilities relies strongly on mechanisms and approaches suggested by the cognitive
literature, such as motivationally-driven, hierarchical action structures, perception-
production coupling, and Simulation Theory. In the following sections, I will evaluate
and discuss these results, exploring their implications for cognitive research, and for
future work in socially intelligent artificial creatures.
7.1 Stumbling Blocks, Successes and Surprises
In the course of developing the characters and interaction scenarios presented in this
thesis, a number of interesting phenomena have come to light. First, and most impor-
tantly, a cognitively-inspired, and in particular, simulation-theory inspired, approach
to social learning in synthetic characters has proven to be extremely effective, and
there is high hope for its extensibility to characters with further social learning skills
and greater social intelligence. Second, using a hierarchical action system contributes
much of the ease and much of the challenge in implementing imitative behavior.
Third, many of the seemingly separate social learning phenomena described in the
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cognitive literature may be relatively easily achieved once a number of core mecha-
nisms (e.g. hierarchical action system, movement recognition, Simulation Theory) are
in place. Finally, the problem of movement recognition is a significant challenge in
interpreting observable behavior, but can be noticeably simplified by using the right
motor representation and body-knowledge. The next few sections will address each
of these issues.
7.1.1 Simulation Theory as the Road to Social Characters
Simulation Theory is in many ways the unifying factor among the various social
learning tasks and mechanisms tackled in this thesis. I chose to consistently use
a simulation-theoretic approach while addressing a wide variety of social learning
problems, in part because of the strong supporting evidence from cognitive and neu-
roscientific research (discussed in section 2.2.1), but also in order to see just how far
an artificial creature could get using itself as a model for other's behavior. As it turns
out, the answer is pretty far, and certainly this thesis has not hit the limit. From
recognizing observed movements, to finding another character's object of attention,
to identifying another's motivations and goals, Simulation Theory has proven to be
an effective approach to a range of social learning problems, and perhaps more im-
portantly, as discussed in the following sections, it is often an approach that simplifies
the problem at hand.
Movement Recognition and Motor Representation
Motion parsing and movement recognition from visual data are extremely challenging
problems, and currently represent very active research areas. In particular, on-line
movement classification systems typically require a large set of training data, and
rely on statistical models to extract motion features from the data that correlate with
particular gestures (but see [16]). However, by using their own movement repertoires
as the example set, our characters are able to perform on-line movement classification
without any training period, and using only a limited set of body part coordinates
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(rather than joint angles or statistical models) as input, which to my knowledge has
not been done before (the current limitations of this approach, as well as possible
extensions, are discussed in sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2).
Advantages of Self-Knowledge: Using Perception-Production Coupling
In the case of movement recognition, and also in general, Simulation Theory allows
for an elegant conservation of representation. The body knowledge that the character
needs in order to identify a movement (where different body parts go, and how they
move) is knowledge it already possesses in order to execute that movement. At the
heart of perception-production coupling is the powerful idea that knowledge necessary
to executing your own actions can be reapplied to interpreting the actions of others,
removing the need for separate 'other modeling' machinery.
For instance, other systems that parse motion capture data into higher level action
sequences, such as Bindiganavale's work [16], often require that spatial and movement
constraints (e.g. 'my feet can't go through the floor when I walk') be explicitly
represented in the constructed action before it is reproduced by another character.
When one of our characters imitates another walking, he knows that his feet can't
go through the floor, because that is already a necessary piece of information for
executing his own walking behavior. In general, the character will automatically apply
any constraints on his own behavior to interpreting behaviors it observes. (However,
unlike Bindiganavale's system, this system does not currently address characters of
different morphology-this is discussed in section 7.2.1).
The Role of Motivationally-Driven Hierarchical Action Structures
in more cognitively complex tasks, the advantage provided by perception-production
coupling can be even more striking, particularly when applied within a hierarchical
action structure. For instance, when a character such as Max maps one of his ac-
tion tuples onto the observed behavior of another, he is not only provided with the
information contained within that tuple-the action to be performed, the immediate
goals of that action, and the environmental context that triggered it-but with all
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the information contained within the hierarchy that tuple belongs to.
When Max see Morris reaching for the cheese, and identifies this with his own
reaching tuple, he knows not only that Morris is reaching for the cheese, but that he
wants to get the cheese-if the cheese were higher up Morris might jump instead of
reach, but both have 'getting' as their goal. Looking still higher up the hierarchy tells
Max that Morris wants to get the cheese because he is hungry, and that he might
want other food items as well.
Motivationally-driven hierarchical action structures provide an ideal cognitive sub-
strate for Simulation Theory, because they so neatly package together the key char-
acteristics of an action-the movements involved, the motivations for the action, and
the actions goals (a slight variation on Call and Carpenter's three sources of informa-
tion, described in section 2.1). Further, hierarchical structures facilitate not only the
recognition of immediate goals and motivations, but also recognition of the hierarchy
of goal-directed behavior that characterizes intentional action (see section 2.2.5). In
other words, using a hierarchical action structure produces a hierarchical intention
structure, and allows such a structure to be recognized in others (see section 2.2.5).
Building Blocks of Social Learning
At the beginning of chapter 2, I introduced the different categories of social learning
described in the cognitive and ethological literature. I also discussed a number of
theories that suggested that these apparently different types of social learning might
result from responding to different aspects of the stimuli or represent different uses
of the same underlying mechanisms and structures.
The work in this thesis seems to strengthen the case for shared social learning
mechanisms. At least in the artificial system presented here, it appears that, given a
number of key mechanisms-namely movement recognition, a motivationally-driven
hierarchical action structure and the ability to simulate another's point-of-view on
that structure, a large number of seemingly disparate social learning abilities can be
demonstrated. To give a few traditional examples:
Stimulus Enhancement While this was not a skill we focused on particularly, Stim-
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ulus Enhancement is easily accomplished in this architecture. In the system
presented here, the other character's object-of-attention is always identified. By
subsequently adopting this object as its own object of attention, our character
would demonstrate stimulus enhancement.
Mimicry and Movement or Action Level Imitation Many different terms have
been used for the simple reproduction of the movements produced by another.
Whatever you want to call it, it has been achieved (and described in detail) in
this thesis.
'True' Imitation Whenever Max demonstrates what he believes Morris to be doing,
he copies not only the form of the movements, but the object they are aimed
at, and what he believes to be their goal.
Emulation Again, while it was not explicitly addressed in this thesis, the characters
presented here are capable of emulating the results (or goals) of an action. They
would do this by focusing only on the matching do-until context of that action,
rather than on the action as a whole.
Identifying Goals and Motivations Perhaps most importantly, hierarchical ac-
tion systems help a character to identify another's motivations and goals at
multiple levels of granularity.
The ability of this system to potentially reproduce all of these forms of social learning
seems to change the critical question from "which kind of social learning is occurring?"
to "which kind of social learning is most appropriate here?". This is not a trivial
question. What the previous list shows us is that attending to different aspects of the
identified action, different levels of the hierarchy, leads to different responses. How
to tell whether the movement, or the object, or the result of the action is the critical
part, whether the immediate goal or its parent is most relevant, are important and
unresolved questions.
Unfortunately, success in an artificial system cannot definitively prove anything
about natural systems-it can only suggest. Nevertheless, the success of this ap-
121
proach, coupled with previous ethological research pointing to the existence of hier-
archical action systems in animals, lends support to the idea that differences in social
learning abilities may represent differences in which levels of the hierarchy different
animals imitate (in the broadest sense of the word), and which sources of information
they attend to.
7.1.2 Limits of Simulation Theory
The Importance of Representational Choice
While there are many obvious benefits provided by perception-production coupling,
to some extent, it is also a double-edged sword, since it makes the choice of how to rep-
resent the character"s self-knowledge doubly important. For example, how movement
is represented and produced by the character's motor system can profoundly influence
how easy it is to use that same representation to recognize another's movements.
Let's say that instead of a motor system made up of example animations (or
movement primitives) we had a motor system that generated animations procedurally,
through a combination of inverse kinematics and physics simulation. It's not entirely
clear how such a representation could even be used to recognize purely visual input.
At the very least, we'd need knowledge of the other character's joint structure, and
of the physical forces impinging upon them.
Substituting Knowledge of Another for Knowledge of Oneself
Similarly, in this thesis, it was fairly challenging to design action tuples in such a
way that they could easily be evaluated from multiple perspectives. There are many
subtleties to taking someone else's point of view-it is not enough to simply pretend
for a moment that the other creature is in your body and leave it at that. In order
for one creature to really simulate another, they must imagine themselves in the
other creature's location, looking where they are looking, and perceiving what they
perceive. More than that, they must remember to think about objects in the world as
they relate to the other not as they relate to themselves. Finally, even their memory
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must be from the other creature's perspective and not their own-what the other was
doing previously, the object they were near 2 seconds ago.
In other words, it is very easy for pre- and post-conditions, motivations and goals,
to implicitly assume the point-of-view of the simulator, and therefore for a Simulation
Theoretic approach to fail. Just because using the same representation for perception
and production can be easier doesn't always mean it has to be. Critical to the suc-
cess of a simulation-theoretic approach is the ease with which a character's
knowledge of another can be substituted for his knowledge of himself.
What Simulation Theory Can't Do, and the Need for a Complete Cognitive
Architecture
Simulation Theory's greatest benefit-economy of representation-is also its greatest
weakness. A purely simulation-theoretic approach would mean that a character can
only understand what it already knows how to do itself. For instance, our character's
motor systems now represent not only the space of movements they are capable of
producing, but the space of movements they are capable of understanding. Sim-
ilarly, the actions our characters can recognize are limited to the ones they already
know how to perform, and the goals they can recognize are limited to the ones they
can try and achieve (but see sections 7.2.6, 7.2.7 and 7.2.8 for ideas on how our
simulation-theoretic approach can be used to learn new movements and bootstrap
the understanding of new actions and goals). In part, this is a limit of our current
system - if our characters had mechanisms for generating new goals perhaps they
could use these structures to generate potential goals for the other character.
However, this solution makes an important point-in many ways, Simulation The-
ory takes the hard problem of theory of mind, and pushes it out into the rest of the
cognitive architecture. The character's ability to understand complex behav-
ior rests on its ability to generate complex behavior. For humans and other
animals this is in general a good deal, since they must be able to generate these same
behaviors in order to survive. Similarly, since the Synthetic Characters system con-
tains a complete cognitive architecture, it was relatively easy to take advantage of the
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already existing cognitive structures to create social learning behaviors. However, it
brings up the question of whether robotic and animated systems designed expressly
for the purpose of interpreting and reacting to human behavior, and thus lacking a
general cognitive framework, could be as successful.
Perhaps the most profound limitation of a Simulation Theoretic approach (at least
in a motivationally driven system) is the inability to understand unknown motiva-
tions. As discussed in section 2.2.1, Simulation Theory rests on the assumption that
the other is "like me", and therefore does things for the same reasons I do. While
novel goals frequently generate novel results, and novel movements and actions are
visually different from known ones, novel motivations are potentially invisible. Thus,
even if a creature has cognitive mechanisms for generating new motivations within
itself (for instance, I currently have a motivational drive to finish this thesis, which
presumably I was not born with), it is not clear that these could be used to un-
derstand an unknown motivation behind another's actions, since it would be hard
to even recognize the motivation as novel, or determine which actions were being
used to satisfy it (but see my discussion in appendix B regarding the fuzziness of the
distinction between motivations and goals).
Of course, it isn't clear that even humans (let alone animated characters) are very
good at understanding others who are radically different from themselves. To the
extent that we are capable of understanding motivations that differ significantly from
our own, other powerful mechanisms, such as language, may come in to play.
7.2 Future Work
While the characters described in this thesis are capable of a number of complex social
learning tasks, in many ways they have just begun to scratch the surface of socially
intelligent behavior. In the following sections, I discuss the limitations of this work,
and illuminate some of the ways in which the work presented in this thesis could be
extended and used to bootstrap additional social learning skills.
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7.2.1 Solving the Correspondence Problem
Currently, the characters in this thesis have a completely hard-wired knowledge of
the correspondence between their own body parts and those of others. Additionally,
the two characters presented in this work have identical morphology, an assumption
that makes movement recognition easier, since it allows observed movements to be
fairly directly compared to those in the character's motor system, without having to
compensate for different proportions. Perhaps more importantly, the characters in
this thesis have easily observable and identifiable body parts (e.g. hands, feet, knees
etc. that can be tracked).
The problem of learning the correspondence between bodies with differing mor-
phologies is an important one to address if we want to develop characters (and robots)
capable of observing, imitating and identifying human action. In order to imitate a
human, characters (and robots) must be able to map the actions they see the person
performing onto their own actions, even though the person is shaped differently from
themselves. I'll address the problems this presents our system in order of complexity.
Ideally, in order to recognize human movements, the character would be able to
observe the person visually, and extract key body part locations from the image (this
is of course currently an ambitious visual processing goal for real-time interaction).
If the character and the model are similarly proportioned (e.g. the demonstrator is
much smaller or larger, but has proportionally similar arms and legs), then the root-
relative positions of their body parts could be scaled and mapped onto the character's
morphology, to create movements that are comparable to those in the character's
repertoire.
If the demonstrator has different proportions from the character we will need to
use an approach that incorporates new information, present, but not used, in this
thesis, in order to learn the mapping from their body to the character's. In this case,
the character could potentially map actions it observes onto its own motion space by
looking not only at the root-relative positions of body parts, but at their positions
relative to each other (and perhaps to objects in the environment). For instance, if
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Morris had a much longer neck than Max, Max could note that when Morris covers
his eyes his hands are next to each other on his face, rather than simply noting how
far his hands have moved from the center of his body (which on short-necked Max,
might translate to way over his head). Similarly, the distance metric for comparing
observed movements to movements in the character's system would have to take
distances between body parts, and not just between body parts and the root node,
into account.
Another approach, one that can be used with visual data or data from motion
capture suits (which is, at present, a more realistic source for human data), is to learn
a model of the correspondence between the demonstrator's and character's bodies
using an interactive training period (this is the approach we used in [28], and used by
Lieberman in [75]). Here, the character performs a series of movements and assumes
that the person (or other character) is imitating them. They can then use one of a
number of standard machine learning techniques (for example neural networks [28]
or RBFs [75]) to develop a model of the correspondence between the observed input
(e.g. body part positions or joint angles) and the movement they just performed. This
approach has the advantage of working with many different forms of data input, and
of mimicking the turn-taking imitation games engaged in by infants and caregivers.
It also allows the character to learn correspondences to demonstrators with very
dissimilar morphologies (e.g. dolphin vs human), though it relies on the demonstrator
to come up with a good imitation of the character's action. Importantly, once a model
is developed, it can be used to represent subsequent observed movements by mapping
them onto the creature's own body. This means that the search for the best-matching
movement, including the distance metric, would not need to be altered.
7.2.2 Other Problems in Imitating Humans
Ultimately, we would like to create synthetic characters who are able to imitate and
understand human action. However, there are a number of additional challenges that
using human motion capture data would present. In general, motion capture data,
particularly data gathered through visual analysis (as opposed to via a motion capture
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suit) is significantly noisier than data gathered through synthetic vision. It remains
to be seen whether the movement parsing and recognition techniques presented here
would hold up to greater signal noise-though the system's ability to compensate for
obstructed data points leads us to be optimistic on this front.
Another problem presented by motion capture data is the possibility of differing
frame rates between the character's motion and the observed human motion. This can
be compensated for using techniques such as interpolation and dynamic time warping,
but again, we will need to see how accurate our movement recognition continues to
be under these conditions.
Motion Parsing
The "hub-and-spoke" model of movement parsing presented in this thesis is a rel-
atively elegant solution to breaking a stream of animated motion into individual
movements. Since a similar approach has been used on human motion capture data
[56], we hope that this method can be generalized, in order to allow our characters
to parse data from human motion as well. The primary challenge there would be in
identifying and recognizing the hubs in the first place, which remains an uncharted
research area (previous work has used user-identified hubs).
In the case of human motion capture data, the supplementary motion parsing tech-
niques mentioned in section 6.1.2 may become more important. For example, using
similar approaches (e.g. looking at end-effector position, and changes in movement
quality) Lieberman [75] has successfully implemented a system for parsing human
movement from a motion capture suit.
7.2.3 Understanding Emotions
Another way in which the system presented in this thesis is currently being extended,
is through the creation of characters who can recognize and respond to each other's
emotions. This thesis has primarily focused on goal-directed actions-actions which
try to to satisfy a particular motivation or carry out an intention, generally towards
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an object in the world. However, humans often perform actions that are instead
emotionally communicative-conveying a particular affective state. People smile,
shrug, give a thumbs up, cross their arms and frown, wring their hands and so on.
Correctly interpreting these sorts of affective gestures is a critical part of human
social interaction [69]-emotion recognition is even considered a significant predictor
of social competence in children [741.
The characters Max and Morris already have a large repertoire of emotionally
significant actions, and a number of autonomic variables devoted to their current
emotional state. By applying the action identification techniques described in this
thesis to emotionally driven portions of their action systems, Max and Morris could
use simulation theory to identify each other's emotions.
For instance, if Max brought Morris a piece of cheese, Morris could respond with
a positive gesture, such as giving a thumbs up, or a negative gesture, such as covering
his face in frustration, or crossing his arms and tapping his foot. Max could search
his own action tree for the emotions that would cause him to display these behaviors,
and know whether Morris was pleased or displeased with his offer. Further, by using
Simulation Theory, he could quickly identify the affective content of many different
gestures, rather than having to learn for example, that both a 'thumbs up' and a 'joy
dance' are positive gestures. A Simulation Theory-style understanding of emotional
displays would be an important part of developing cooperative behavior between
characters. For related work on agents who interpret and display emotion see for
example Breazeal's work with Kismet [26], Picard's Affective Computing research
[92], and Cassell's Gesture and Narrative Language research [37].
7.2.4 Cooperative Behavior
One critical aspect of human social behavior is our ability to cooperate and work
on joint tasks. The American Heritage Dictionary defines cooperating as "to work
together towards a common end or purpose" [2]. Thus, in order for one character to
engage in cooperative behavior with another it must be able to recognize and adopt
the other's goal.
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The first step of cooperative behavior, recognizing the other's goal, has already
been accomplished (at least at a low level) in this thesis. Max is able to identify the
goals of Morris's actions by looking at the goals of his own actions. We are currently
implementing the second step-acting on this goal in order to help accomplish it.
Here we are faced with a potentially tricky situation, which I will use an example
to illustrate. Let's say that Morris's goal (that is the success do-until for his action)
is to get himself the cheese. In order to help Morris, Max must now act in a way that
is both different from how he would get the cheese for himself, and how he would get
the cheese if he were Morris. In both those cases, Max would simply go get the cheese
for himself, which would not help Morris at all.
Simulation Theory has helped Max identify Morris's goal which is "get myself the
cheese", but in order to act correctly Max must now alter that goal slightly before
acting on it himself-it must become "get Morris the cheese". Now, Max will be
ready to identify (or construct) an action that satisfies this goal.
Finally, there are multiple levels of goals in the action hierarchy, and it will be an
interesting question to explore which ones to help satisfy when. For instance, instead
of trying to get Morris the out-of-reach cheese, Max could recognize Morris's hunger,
and get him some ice cream instead.
7.2.5 Predicting Future Actions
Another piece of functionality that already exists in the system, but has not yet been
put to use, is the ability to predict other character's future actions. The simplest way
to do this would be for a character to evaluate their action hierarchy using conditions
that assume the success of the identified action. For example, when Max see Morris
reaching for the cheese, he knows that the success context of reaching for the cheese
is holding the cheese. Max could now check which of his own action tuples has a can-
I trigger satisfied by holding the cheese, and would discover that the eating action
does. He could then predict that, once Morris gets the cheese, he's likely to eat it.
This approach could potentially be made even more accurate by having the character
keep track of which actions tend to follow which (an action-action map similar to
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the movement-action map already in use), and using this information to help with
ambiguous predictions.
7.2.6 Learning New Movements
For simplicity's sake, in this thesis, Max simply ignored any observed movements
he didn't recognize. However, characters using the architecture presented in this
thesis have been developed who create new movements from unrecognized observed
gestures, and add them to their movement repertoire. One ongoing issue in this
area is deciding whether a movement is new or simply a relatively poor match to
an existing movement. We have previously addressed the problem of modeling novel
movements and distinguishing them from known movements, and plan to apply the
approach described in Blumberg 2002 [21] here.
7.2.7 Learning New Actions
The trickiest part of learning new movements isn't learning how to perform them, it's
learning when to use them. As discussed earlier (see section 3.2.1), imitation has often
been seen as a potential way to quickly teach characters or robots what movements
(or combinations of movements) to perform in which situations. Currently, Max can
learn new objects to apply existing actions to, by watching Morris interact with these
objects. We would like him to be able to learn new actions to perform by observing
Morris as well.
If a movement, or series of movements is executed in response to an unfamiliar
environmental context, and generates an unfamiliar result, it may represent a new
action. If the result is a desirable one-perhaps one that already matches the goal
state of one of the observing character's existing actions-it may be worth while to
construct a new action tuple based on this observation. So for instance, let's say that
Max saw Morris use a tool, such as a rake, to bring food closer to himself. Using the
raking movement in the context of out-of-reach food may not be familiar to Max, but
the result-holding and eating the food-is. He could then construct an action tuple
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that requests a raking movement, and is triggered by the presence of a rake and of
out-of-reach food, and has holding the food as its do-until context.
There are of course some subtleties of implementation here, that need to be ex-
plored. Identifying the results and triggering contexts of an action, as distinct from
other aspects of the changing environment, is a challenge. Simulation Theory may
potentially help here as well, allowing the character to focus on the kinds of environ-
mental events and changes it normally finds most salient.
7.2.8 Learning New Goals
Perhaps the most critical step in intelligent social behavior (and in intelligent behavior
in general) is the ability to adopt new goals and sub-goals. Our characters could
potentially learn new goals to pursue by watching others act. If another creature
repeatedly uses actions to achieve the same novel result, this result may represent a
new goal.
As mentioned in the previous section, it can be difficult to pick out the result of
an action from other changes in the environment. This problem is compounded in
the case of new goals, since actions are not always successful, and the result of an
action may not necessarily be the desired one.
Our characters can mitigate these problems by applying their other social skills
to the task of understanding novel goals. In particular, this is a situation where
affective feedback and social referencing may be particularly critical. A result is
unlikely to be the desired one if the other character appears unhappy with it, but if
the demonstrator is happy with the result, they were probably intending to achieve
it. Similarly, when the imitating character tries to adopt the new goal it can look to
the model for approval, to see if it has the right idea.
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The Future-Towards Characters who want to Learn, and Demonstrators
who want to Teach
In general, one of the fundamental features of human social interaction and social
learning is that it is almost never one way-instead, human social interaction is
characterized by turn-taking, feedback and reciprocity. A character who must learn
by observing an oblivious demonstrator is relatively limited in what it can discover.
On the other hand, characters who are aided by the presence of a knowledgeable
demonstrator will have many additional opportunities to learn available to them (see
Breazeal et. al.'s work on interactive tutelage for humanoid robots [29]). Our ultimate
goal for the future then, may be to develop synthetic characters and robots who are
capable of taking full advantage of what others (particularly humans) want to teach
them. A Simulation Theory-based social learning system, that allows such characters
to correctly interpret and respond to the behaviors of those they interact with, will be
an important first step towards this type of socially intelligent, and socially responsive,
artificial creature.
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Appendix A
Synthetic Vision
Note: This appendix is adapted from Isla 2001 [65].
Synthetic Vision renders the world from the character's point of view. The location of
a visible object can be extracted visually by examining the screen-space coordinates
of the centroid of the object in the point-of-view rendering. This 2-vector combined
with depth information from the rendering's depth buffer yield the NDC-coordinates
of the object (see [48 for a discussion of NDC-space and camera projections). These
coordinates can be converted into the local space of the camera (and of the observing
creature's eye) through the inverse-NDC transformation.
Assuming that the x and y NDC-coordinates range from -1 to 1, and the z NDC-
coordinate ranges from 0 (at the eye-position) to 1 (infinitely far), and assuming that
the camera projection properties are given by a frustum defined by fnear, fjar, fleft,
fright, ftor and fbottom, the NDC-to-Local transformation is given by the following
equations:
(-fnear * ffar)
(fcar - fnear) * z fc + far
Xiocal = Ziocal * (fright * Xndc - fleft* Xndc - fright - fleft) (A.2)2 fnear
Ylocal 2 focal * (ftop * Yndc - fbottom * Yndc - ftor - fbottom (A.3)2fnear
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Appendix B
Terminology
Throughout this work I have used a number of potentially ambiguous terms. While
there are any number of official (and differing) definitions for these words, I would
like to briefly describe how they have been used in this thesis. Words that are listed
together have been used relatively interchangeably.
Movement, Motion, Gesture A movement, motion or gesture refers to a motor
pattern played out on a creature's body-the series of muscle (or motor, or
animated muscle) movements carried out by that creature, without reference
to their context. Examples of movements from this thesis include: jumping,
reaching and covering the eyes.
Action An action is a movement, or series of movements, placed in an environmental
and motivational context. That is, an action occurs in response to certain (in-
ternal or external) circumstances, and generally has a desired result associated
with it. Examples of actions include: jumping for the cheese, reaching for the
ball, covering eyes in frustration.
Intention, Goal An intention or goal is a desired result the character plans to try
and achieve, often associated with the actions the character plans to use to
achieve it (which can then be described as goal-directed). Examples of goals
are: getting the baton, eating the cheese and getting close enough to the ball to
reach it
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Motivation, Drive Motivations and drives are the 'why' behind intentions and
goals. They are the reason for wanting the baton or eating the cheese. Ex-
amples of motivations and drives are: Satisfying hunger, desire to play and
desire to socialize.
To clarify further, let's take the simple example of Max reaching for the cheese. In
this situation, Max's movement is reaching, his action is reaching for the cheese,
his goal is to get the cheese, and his motivation is that he's hungry.
The distinction between motivations and goals to some extent melts away as we
go farther up the action hierarchy. As actions become coarser in granularity, the
difference between an intention and a drive appears to merge-at the top level one
could argue that satisfying hunger is both a goal and a motivation. While this is an
interesting point, teasing out the differences between goals and motivations is beyond
the scope of this thesis, so I will simply note the potential vagueness of the current
definitions, and leave it at that.
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